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Here we deconstruct, and then in a reasoned way reconstruct, the concept of “entropy of a system,” paying
particular attention to where the randomness may be coming from. We start with the core concept of
entropy as a count associated with a description; this count (traditionally expressed in logarithmic form for
a number of good reasons) is in essence the number of possibilities—specific instances or “scenarios,” that
match that description. Very natural (and virtually inescapable) generalizations of the idea of description
are the probability distribution and of its quantum mechanical counterpart, the density operator.
We track the process of dynamically updating entropy as a system evolves. Three factors may cause en-
tropy to change: (1) the system’s internal dynamics; (2) unsolicited external influences on it; and (3) the
approximations one has to make when one tries to predict the system’s future state. The latter task is usu-
ally hampered by hard-to-quantify aspects of the original description, limited data storage and processing
resource, and possibly algorithmic inadequacy. Factors 2 and 3 introduce randomness—often huge amounts
of it—into one’s predictions and accordingly degrade them. When forecasting, as long as the entropy
bookkeping is conducted in an honest fashion, this degradation will always lead to an entropy increase.
To clarify the above point we introduce the notion of honest entropy, which coalesces much of what is of
course already done, often tacitly, in responsible entropy-bookkeping practice. This notion—we believe—
will help to fill an expressivity gap in scientific discourse. With its help, we shall prove that any dynamical
system—not just our physical universe—strictly obeys Clausius’s original formulation of the second law of
thermodynamics if and only if it is invertible. Thus this law is a tautological property of invertible systems!
This is a great paper. I worked on thermodynamics for
many years, and entropy is at the centre of my research
in this area, yet this paper made me see that there were
many things I thought I understood but actually didn’t,
and clarified many of them for me. . . . The style is unique.
I honestly can say that I never read anything like this and
that I enjoyed it thoroughly. The last thing I would like
is for the style to be changed, even though it is far from
that of a standard scientific paper.
—Entropy’s Referee 1
This paper is a delight. I have studied and written about
entropy for years, and find the definition [of entropy] as “a
function that assigns a number to a description” really
hits the nail on the head. This paper is original and
significant; . . . in sum, marvelous paper.
—Entropy’s Referee 2
1 Introduction
Forgive them, for they mean not what they say.
—Paraphrase of Luke 23:34
In recent decades, entropy has come to be applied very
broadly. And like a few other scientific constructs which
had “made the grade” in earlier decades—such as evolu-
tion, relativity, and quantum mechanics—entropy too has
found favor with the general public and somehow managed
to become a household word. It carries the right combina-
tion of glamor, tantalizing promise, and prurient mystery.
It comes in handy in general conversation, without requiring
of the parties much commitment or understanding. This of
course abets vagueness, confusion, misuse, and abuse, and
the propagation of “urban legends” about it that occasion-
ally penetrate even responsible scientific quarters (see the
Shannon entry in §4).
My primary purpose here is to review how and why the
entropy “of a system” (the scare quotes, as we shall see,
are deliberate) evolves in time as the system itself evolves;
and to stress of what a radically different nature those two
evolution processes are. To anticipate, the second process
is in the nature of bookkeeping, which, to be useful, must
first of all be honest.
As part of this endeavor, I will motivate and then intro-
duce the concept of honest entropy. This fills, I believe,
a gap in the literature of entropy and the second law of
thermodynamics.
To help concentrate minds, my rhetorical (and pedagog-
ical) device will take the form of a campaign to dispel a
number of widespread myths about entropy, such as:
1. The belief that, in spite of having the same name and
sporting the same formula, information-theoretical en-
tropy (a` la Shannon and Jaynes) is actually “something
completely different” from physical entropy (a` la Clau-
sius, Boltzmann, and Gibbs).
2. The myth—pace Clausius—that physical entropy is a
property of a definite material body one can point to—
such as the copper bar now lying on my lab bench—
and is a physical property, like volume, temperature,
composition, internal energy, etc., that anyone can ob-
jectively determine by physical means and track as it
changes in time.
3. The myth that the approach of an isolated system to-
ward its maximum entropy, though generally mono-
tonic (i.e.,without ever changing direction) as predi-
cated by Clausius, is actually subject to statistical fluc-
tuations a` la Ehrenfest (see §7.5)—with entropy occa-
sionally decreasing rather than increasing.
4. The myth that the (information-theoretical) entropy
of the deck of cards now lying on my table is an in-
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trinsic property of it, which anyone can determine by
inspecting the deck itself.
5. The belief that logarithms—as encountered in Boltz-
mann’s formula S = k logW and Gibbs’s and Shan-
non’s S = −k∑i pi log pi are an essential feature of
the entropy concept.
To add insult to injury, I’ll throw in two more old chestnuts:
6. The myth that entropy, whether physical or
information-theoretical, is something that you mea-
sure.
7. The myth that the second law of thermodynamics is
a law of physics (please wait until §5 before you cast
your stone).
2 Myths: pros and cons
Relax now! I wholeheartedly grant that all good myths have
at their core an element of truth, and that their telling and
retelling may have pedagogical value. I myself can think of
many circumstances where any one of the above myths may
serve a useful purpose—as an aid to intuition, in popular
science; as a stepping stone, in teaching; and in ordinary
scientific discourse, as a convenient abbreviation when the
underlying core truth is understood. Let’s take the follow-
ing dialogue as a case study.
Teacher: Think of random number between 1 and 10.
Pupil: Seven!
As an aside on the limitations of human psychology, let me remark
that the empirical odds are about 1:1 in favor of this answer.
Teacher: What? (sarcastically) What may make you
think that seven, of all numbers, should be random?
It’s an ordinary, perfectly definite number, like 1, 2,
and 3—in fact, everyone knows it comes right after 6!
Pupil: (blushes, embarrassed)
Teacher: Class, Home assignment: List all numbers
from 1 to 100 and put a mark next to those that are odd.
On a separate column, mark all those that are prime.
On a third column, mark all those that are random!
Of course, there is no such thing as a “random number”—
that is a mythical beast. “Being random” is not the prop-
erty of any particular number—this qualifier applies to a
procedure that will generate a number. Thus, “Give me a
random number” can only be understood as shorthand for
“Use a random procedure to generate a number, and give
me the result.”
To what extent a “random procedure” may itself be some sort of
mythical beast, that’s another kettle of fish. Even though the art
has made enormous strides since then, one should still keep in mind
von Neumann’s quip, that “Anyone who attempts to generate random
numbers by deterministic means is, of course, living in a state of sin.”
(But see end of §8.5.)
One may argue with John White[31] that “Too much spe-
cific information presented too soon may well be aestheti-
cally undesirable. On the other hand, one may ask, with
Gerald Dworkin[5], “Are these ten lies justified?”
A compromise was acknowledged by the medieval Jewish
philosopher Maimonides. Joseph Stern[25] seems to con-
clude that the latter actually not only acknowleges but in-
deed endorses, and even prescribes, the double standard of
“[mythological] religion for the masses and philosophy for
the elite.”
For my part, I prefer to ask, cui prodest? (“who has more
to gain?”), the teacher or the pupil, and on what time scale?
A short-term prop that is cheap for the teacher today may
well leave a pupil happy now (less mental work), but with a
model of the world that may have to be gutted and rebuilt
later (if ever)—possibly at much greater cost.
The ten dollars’ worth of salt we spread on the driveway to save us the
pain of snow shoveling will cost the community $200 for consequent
damage to roads, bridges, cars, water supply, and wild life.
What I recommend instead is to help build a world model
that is honest from the start, while only making use—at
least initially—of those constructs that are absolutely vital.
The latter is a feature, not a regrettable concession!
3 Approach
[It] ain’t over till the fat lady sings!
—journalist Ralph Carpenter, 2006
In that spirit, I will start by introducing a very lean con-
cept of entropy accompanied by a very lean concept of dy-
namical system, and in a few steps arrive at a very lean-
and-mean second law of thermodynamics that does all the
right things.
After that, beginning with the lean concept and making
a single, modest generalization, I’ll arrive at a fully fleshed-
out entropy—essentially the one you would be familiar with.
This generalization—essentially, replacing a set by a multi-
set—is pre-announced in a warning box at the beginning of
§5, but is actually carried out only in section §8.
I’ll finally argue that such generalization is not even
strictly necessary (and possibly not even sufficient). It’s
just a convenient shortcut, and besides it’s not universally
applicable. One could get along just as well, if not better,
by using a more sophisticated scenario as a “wrapper” for
the lean entropy we had started with. This approach (§8.5)
may not be practical, since it doesn’t carry out any simpli-
fications until the very last step (cf. the present section’s
epigraph), and is thus exceedingly cumbersome—but it’s a
good device for thought experiments.
All of the above is directly applicable not only to physics
and communication channels, but also to scenarios of other
sciences as well as to much of ordinary life.
On reading the above, many a one of you will respond
with a dismissive sneer, “I already knew all of that!” and,
pointing to a twelve-foot stack of books and papers on their
office floor labeled entropy and the second law, add
“In fact, I have it all here!—ehem . . . someplace around
here.”
Others, I hope, will go to their offices, and beaming with
relief will throw out most of their twelve-foot stacks, keep-
ing only a few trusted pieces—thus making room (in their
brains as well as their offices) for the new, exciting stuff
that I’m sure will later show up in their lives. Pointing to
the small stack left they’ll say with pride, after Hillel, “This
is the entire thing—all the rest is commentary !”
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When a potential convert approached Babylonian rabbi Hillel and
asked whether he could be taught the entire Torah while standing
on one foot—the 1st century bc equivalent of an “elevator speech”—
Hillel summarized as follows, “That which is hateful to you do not do
to others. All the rest is commentary. Now go and learn.”[Shabbos
31A]
They will surely add with bated voice (as I imagine Hil-
lel did too) “And, for that matter, mostly frivolous, rep-
etitious, superfluous, of merely archival nature, or too
technical—when not actually wrong !”
Familiarity with the concept of entropy is useful in all
walks of life. Entropy rightly belongs to everybody—kind
of a “Unesco World Heritage Concept.” But how many
are in a position to step up and claim their inheritance?
Not every Tom, Joan, and Harry can afford the space, in
their brains as well as in their living rooms, for a twelve-foot
stack of papers—or have the time, the preparation, and the
discipline to wade through them!
Let’s face it, outside of our specialty we are all Toms,
Joans, and Harrises, and the baggage of our everyday in-
terests and projects leaves little space in our lives for extra
clutter. Pace Maimonides, I have attempted a drastic com-
pression of the resources needed for everybody—not only
the specialist—to understand “entropy and all that” and
make an honest use of it. Compressing by popularizing,
mythologizing, and patronizing is easy, but tends to throw
out the baby with the bathwater; I wanted mine to be a
lossless compression.
Working on this project was great fun, especially thinking
of how much room it would make in my own life for new
projects.
4 Entropy 000
Before attempting a reconstruction of entropy, let us see
what kind of edifice we have to begin with, whose function-
ality we aim to duplicate by the most frugal means. Here
is a brief historical sketch.
Clausius (1850)
For German physicist Rudolf Clausius, entropy is a phys-
ical quantity pertaining to a body, like internal energy and
mass. It has the physical dimension of heat capacity, de-
noted by ET−1, where E means a quantity “of the energy
type” and T, “of the temperature type.” Accordingly, it’s
measured today in units of joules per kelvin (J/K).
Clausius wrote nine memoirs between 1850 and 1865, col-
lected with an introduction and appendices in [4]. The last
few lines of the ninth memory say
[Having introduced entropy beside energy,] we
may express in the following manner the funda-
mental laws of the universe which correspond to
the two fundamental theorems of the mechanics
of heat:
1. The energy of the universe
is constant.
2. The entropy of the universe
tends to a maximum.
Those are the famous two laws of thermodynamics.1 They
sport a poetic concision comparable to the last few lines
of Darwin’s Origin of Species (appeared at about the same
time, 1859), which say
Whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to
the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful
have been, and are being, evolved.
The quantity that Clausius thought up would tell under what condi-
tions a thermodynamical “body” (or “system,” to use a more modern
term) could progress from a given initial state to a desired final state
spontaneously—that is, without being pushed by an external agency.
Clausius had initially called this quantity (for which he proposed the
symbol S) the “transformation content” of the body, but later himself
coined for it the term “entropy,” in analogy with physical “energy”
(having especially in mind the body’s internal energy U , comprising
both the mechanical and the thermal energy stored in the body itself).
In his words,
We might call S the transformation content of the body,
just as we termed the magnitude U its thermal and ergonal
content. But as I hold it that terms for important magni-
tudes had better be made up from the ancient languages,
so that they may be adopted unchanged in all modern lan-
guages, I propose to call the magnitude S the entropy of the
body, from the Greek word trope¯, transformation. I have
intentionally formed the word entropy so as to be as simi-
lar as possible to the word energy, for the two magnitudes
to be denoted by these words are so nearly allied in their
physical meanings that a certain similarity in designation
appears to be desirable[4, 9th memoir].
The wordplay here is that in Greek trope¯ and e´rgon respectively mean
‘transformation’ and ‘work’ (as well as ‘activity’, ‘energy’, ‘force’), and
en means ‘in’, so that ‘en-ergy’ can be construed as “work-in-it” or
“work contents” (note that the German for ‘contents’ is In-halt or
‘in-held’); by the same token, ‘en-tropy’ may well be taken to literally
mean “transformation contents.”
Boltzmann (1877)
Boltzmann’s out-of-the-box intuition was that entropy
is not a material quantity (“Five gallons of entropy—and
check the tires!”), but just the logarithm of a count. In his
formula
S = k lnW
S denotes entropy, ln is the natural logarithm (i.e.,log in
base e), and W the number of complexions—as explained in
a moment. The coefficient k appends—to what is otherwise
a pure number—the physical dimensional unit required to
remain consistent with Clausius’s usage.
Originally, those complexions were imagined to be the dif-
ferent ways that thermal energy can rearrange itself within
a body of a certain description. These fine-grained internal
arrangements roughly correspond to what today we call a
body’s microstates (while a macrostate is the very descrip-
tion of the body in terms of the whole set of microstates it
can possibly be found in). Note that Boltzmann’s “body”
is already a more abstract entity than Clausius’s.
For Boltzmann, a “body” is no longer that one scrawny plucked
chicken that you brought back from the farmer’s market, but an entry
in the supermarket’s flyer—a type of product. That’s why when you
meet your neighbor at the supermarket you can tell her, “I bought
1For the casual reader, a popular but scientifically solid introduc-
tion may be found in [17].
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the same chicken as yours!” even though you two walk home with a
pullet apiece.
Similarly, when the four customers from table 7 all ordered the
same chicken dish they cannot complain if the four servings were not
literally “the same”—there certainly were some small differences. In
how many ways a serving can qualify as being a match for a given
menu item, this may be just a philosophical question for a chef; but
it may lead a physicist like Boltzmann to a revealing insight.
Gibbs (1902)
Gibbs’s idea of entropy is captured by the formula
S = −k
∑
i
pi ln pi, (1)
in current use today.
Note that it is Gibbs that coined the name of the whole discipline,
statistical mechanics. Incidentally, Albert Einstein was unaware of
Gibbs’s contributions in that field when, between 1902 and 1904, he
wrote three papers on statistical mechanics. After reading Gibbs’s
textbook, in the 1905 German translation by Ernst Zermelo, Einstein
declared that Gibbs’s treatment was superior to his own and explained
that he would not have written those papers if he had known Gibbs’s
work[21].
Gibbs’s formulation[8] represents a modest generalization
of Boltzmann’s approach—not a radical upheaval. Instead
of individual microstates, the i’s in the above formula rep-
resent kinds of like microstates, and pi denotes what share
of a certain population is represented by individuals of kind
i. In other words, instead of explicitly counting individual
microstates Gibbs counts kinds of microstates, but weights
them in terms of what fraction of the total number of mi-
crostates each kind represents.
Note: This is the generalization mentioned at the begin-
ning of §3.
von Neumann (1927)
In quantum mechanics, the concept of macroscopic state of a sys-
tem is captured by a density operator [32, 22] (co-discovered by Lev
Landau), a composite of an empirical uncertainty already found in
classical mechanics (“in principle we could always get a sharper pic-
ture of the state of a system through a more refined observation”) and
an irreducible uncertainty peculiar to quantum mechanics (“there are
aspects of a system that we can know more about only at the cost of
ending up knowing less about other aspects of the same system).
Von Neumann’s entropy of a density operator—which is
a generalization of a probability distribution—is defined as
S = −κ
∑
i
ρi ln ρi, (2)
where the ρi’s are the eigenvalues of the operator. Formally
this is much like Gibbs’s expression.
According to standard quantum mechanics, there are
concretely testable aspects of a physical system that can-
not be accounted for by simply postulating a description of
the whole universe in terms of a single overarching prob-
ability distribution over it (this is an implication of Bell’s
inequality), but where, as far as physicists know, a density
operator will do (cf. §8.5).
Shannon (1948)
To answer questions of how much information could be
“squeezed” through an information channel such as a tele-
graph line, Shannon came out in 1948 with a fully fleshed-
out Information Theory [23, 19]. In this theory, the expres-
sion for entropy is
S = −
∑
i
pi ln pi. (3)
Note that this formula does away with Boltzmann’s and
Gibbs’s “legacy” dimensional factor k (or von Neumann’s
κ), so that here S remains a dimensionless quantity—a
“pure number.”
In April 1961 Shannon was in residence at MIT for a week, and Prof
Tribus, a pioneer at revealing the connections between information
theory and thermodynamics and at adopting Jaynes’s MaxEnt prin-
ciple (see Jaynes entry right below), had occasions to spend time
with him. He asked Shannon whether he hadn’t been afraid, when he
named his information-theoretic quantity “entropy,” that this would
create confusion with the original use of the word in thermodynamics.
According to Tribus’s recollection’s[30], Shannon replied:
My greatest concern was what to call it. I thought of calling
it ‘information’, but the word was overly used, so I decided
to call it ‘uncertainty’. When I discussed it with John von
Neumann, he had a better idea. Von Neumann told me,
“You should call it entropy, for two reasons. In the first
place your uncertainty function has been used in statistical
mechanics under that name. In the second place, and more
importantly, no one knows what entropy really is, so in a
debate you will always have the advantage!”
The emphasis is mine. Note how, a good century after the invention
of entropy, von Neumann—a polymath physicist—was well aware of
how even professional physicists still stood somewhat confused as to
what entropy really is.
Here I cannot resist a bit of gossip. In the same week, Tribus gave
an MIT seminar on a new way, based on information theory, to derive
thermodynamics. He states that a critical audience, comprised of
students of American mechanical engineer Joseph Keenan (founder of
the MIT school of thermodynamics) “tried to rip it apart.” Moreover,
French mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot, who was in the audience,
quickly attacked the MaxEnt interpretation, saying: “Everyone knows
that Shannon’s derivation is in error.”[29]
That shows what strong feelings people may have about “mere
matters of interpretation” of entropy and thermodynamics.
Jaynes (1952)
ET Jaynes was an ardent developer and preacher of the
Bayesian interpretation of statistical mechanics. He “em-
phasized a natural correspondence between statistical me-
chanics and information theory. In particular, [he] offered a
new and very general rationale why the Gibbsian method of
statistical mechanics works. He argued that the entropy of
statistical mechanics and the information entropy of infor-
mation theory are principally the same thing. Consequently,
statistical mechanics should be seen just as a particular ap-
plication of a general tool of logical inference” ([33]; empha-
sis mine).
He’s best known for the introduction of the principle of
maximum entropy (or MaxEnt)[13, 9]. Adapting from [28],
If, in a given context, you need to formulate a
probability distribution on which to base your
bets, choose, among all possible distributions that
agree with what you know about the problem,
the one having maximum entropy. Why? Is this
guaranteed to be the “real” (whatever that may
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mean) probability distribution? Of course not! In
fact you will most likely replace it with a new
one as soon as you see the outcome of the next
trial—because by then you’ll have one more piece
of information. Why, then? Because any other
choice—being tantamount to throwing away some
of the information you have or assuming informa-
tion you don’t have—would be indefensible.
This principle, then, introduces a criterion of honesty into
the otherwise poorly constrained process of inference: ideal
witnesses are expected not to just “tell the truth,” but tell
the whole truth (as far as each can know it) and nothing but
the truth.
The concept of honest entropy presented in this paper
develops and refines the qualifiers “as far as” and “nothing
but.”
Other entrants (1945–)
A number of other concepts were developed in the past
seventy years in attempts to quantify properties such as va-
riety, diversity, multiplicity, richness, and distinctiveness,
making use of different kinds of mean and of scaling func-
tion. We will mention some of these in our deconstruction
of Gibbs’s formula in §8.
5 Entropy 001
If you can’t describe it, you can’t put it into your equa-
tions.
—William Briggs, wmbriggs.com/post/17974 (12 Feb
2016)
Indeed, the very hairs of your head are all numbered.
—Luke 12:7
In the mercantile world, there are obvious difficulties
in determining a fair barter rate for goods of a different
nature—“How much of my ‘land’ is your ‘oil’ worth?”.
Physics’ “merchants” have found it expedient to value cer-
tain of their wares in terms of a notional currency called
entropy. But language and customs, as we know, vary from
region to region and from time to time. Are we sure that
Trader Gibbs’s entropy is the same thing as Master Boltz-
mann’s? How come Prof Clausius’s entropy grows monoton-
ically towards a maximum, while that used by Herr Ehren-
fest may occasionally dip? Which of these two merchants
would you rather do business with? As we shall see (§7.5),
Herr Ehrenfest must have learned to play poker at a place
where “peeking” was allowed!
Here we shall introduce a “primitive conceptual gage” for
entropy, a reference benchmark against which more sophis-
ticated entropy constructs can be tallied.
In biology, this role used to be played by the exemplar specimen of a
species, kept in a museum. If there was a doubt about a naturalist’s
correct identification of his specimen, in principle one could compare it
to the exemplar and see whether (in spite of being hairier, larger, or of
a slightly different color) it displayed certain essential characteristics
of the latter (four legs, stubby tail, suckles offspring, yet lays eggs—
remember the ornithorhyncus?).
As we shall see, a distinguishing trait of entropy is being
of the nature of a count—the size (or cardinality) of a set.
“If it ain’t a count, then it ain’t entropy!”
Those of you who are tempted to immediately cry “Foul!
This is not the entropy we know!” should wait for §8.1,
§8.3, and §8.5, where probability distributions will be
introduced and discussed. Similarly, those who expect
to see logarithmic scaling should wait for §8.2. The
“lean” concept of entropy—that is, entropy as a count—
announced in §3, introduced in the present section, and
used throughout for the first two-thirds of this paper—will
be complemented in the last third (sections §8 through
§10—by the “full-bodied” concept that you would be fa-
miliar with—namely, entropy as a log of an equivalent
count.
What kind of bench should provide the benchmarks to
tally entropy against? What makes a quantity “entropy-
like” rather than, say, “velocity-like?” When we hear “the
entropy of a body” (Clausius), or, in more modern terms,
“of a system,” our first reflex should be “The entropy of pre-
cisely what? What kind of thing can entropy be a property
of?” We already saw that in the phrase “prime number” the
term “prime” is used to qualify a number as being prime,
while in the locution “random number” what is really be-
ing qualified as random is not a number but a method for
generating one.
Let us then announce, without further ado, that
entropy is a property of a description,
namely, the number of items
that match that description.
(4)
Thus, entropy is a function that assigns a number to a
description.
I’ve taken the liberty, for the sake of plainer English, to call “de-
scription” what is, more generally, a characterization, that is, some-
thing that can be used to narrow a choice, to tell by any means avail-
able whether or not an item belongs to a set. Take the phrase “Be
considerate—of the prom photos in that box only pick one of which
there are more than one copy left!” This doesn’t “describe” a photo
in the narrow sense of “telling what it looks like.” Yet in the given
circumstances, where I can see all the photos in the box at once, it
surely characterizes a definite subset of them.
Having clarified the meaning of description, one may now
ask, “Description of what? Well, of practically anything
of which many possibilities or variants are available, out
of which the description itself will identify a subset. The
ordering of a deck of cards; a card hand, such as “four-
of-a-kind;” the set of possible microscopic inner arrange-
ments of a human-scale object; a liter of gas described as
“at standard conditions of pressure and temperature,” and
thus entailing a certain (astronomical) number of possible
complexions of position-and-velocity of its molecules; the
state of a finite-state automaton; a generic “winning chess
move,” as contrasted to a specific chess move which hap-
pens to be a winning one; a computer procedure which you
call on the basis of its API description,2 trusting that what-
ever code is underneath will do what the description seems
2An Application Programming Interface is a repertoire of accessi-
ble programming commands that hide low-level (“technical”) details
not needed by the high-level programmer. In this way, application de-
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to imply; an email message waiting for you to read it; the
vehicle that hit me; whatever parasite is responsible for my
illness; an “alkaline metal;” a tic-tac-toe game; the next
president of the United States; a plausible universe; even
another description!
Here is an example of descriptions of an object. A po-
liceman spots a man lying by the roadside. “Are you hurt?
What’s the story?” “A glancing blow by a hit-and-run ve-
hicle, officer.” “That’s not much help; there are perhaps
a hundred thousand vehicles within fifty miles of here—I
can’t stop everyone. But, let’s see, what kind of vehicle?
A truck?” “No, it was a small car.” “That’s better—we’ve
restricted the choice to about ten thousand cars. Did you
notice the color?” “Yes, it was red!” “Splendid—we are
down to a thousand. And when did this happen?” “Oh,
no more than five minutes ago.” “Then they can only have
gone a few miles. Within that reach, we are talking about
a dozen cars. I will give it a try!” (speaking on his radio)
“To all police cars: Hit-and-run accident near Springbrook’s
North Exit. Stop all small red cars within five miles of there
and report to me.”
Our target is undoubtedly one specific object—the car
involved in the accident. It is generally believed, since the
time of Laplace, that at a microscopic level of detail our
physical world is strictly invertible. In principle, if at the
present moment we took a sufficiently detailed snapshot of
a large enough portion of the world around the site of the
accident, and ran this system backwards in time by means
of a sufficiently detailed simulation, in five minutes (of sim-
ulated time) a usable record of the accident—car, licence
plate, driver, collision details—would materialize under our
eyes.
But we can’t do that in practice—today at least!
Though we learn fast. Today we can routinely tell paternity, and have
started deciphering affidavits written on gravitational waves a billion
years ago and billions of billions of miles away.
To try to bring the driver to justice, all we can use to iden-
tify the car by is whatever circumstantial evidence we can
summon up—in plain words, a description of the car by wit-
nesses (even inanimate ones, such as tire tracks). It will be
up to courts and lawyers to pass in review all the conceiv-
able objects that match that description, and see to what
extent each of these objects fits in with other external fac-
tual data. For example, if it turns out that—at the time of
the accident—a car otherwise matching the description had
been captured by a videocamera filling up at a gas station,
that particular car may be written off.
In the estimate of the officer, the first description (“a
hit-and-run vehicle”) gave a hundred thousand matches. A
more refined one (“a small car”) yielded one-tenth as many.
The next refinement (“a red one”) further shrank the num-
ber of matches down to one thousand. Finally, taking into
account also the timing (“less than five minutes ago”), the
number of possible choices dwindled to a dozen.
velopers are free to change “under the hood” details of the technical
implementation without disrupting the application’s behavior. Thus
an API stands for a whole equivalence class of low-level programs
yielding the same high-level behavior.
So we have four different descriptions of the same target,
and each comes with a number attached to it—the number
of vehicles that match that description. This number is
not, in any sense, an intrinsic property of the vehicle—it is
a property of a description of it, including external details
such as where and when.
I want to stress again that it is such a number, associ-
ated with a description and reflecting how many items fit
that description, that constitutes the essence of the entropy
concept. In §8.3, after introducing the idea of probability—
again in a basic form3—I’ll show that a very natural (and
virtually inescapable) generalization of the concept of de-
scription given here is that of a probability distribution. In
fact, it is on that generalization that the canonical defini-
tion of entropy rests—the entropy “of a probability distri-
bution.” But to make sense of this we’ll have to clarify
“probability” first.
A concrete example
A colleague points at two identical-looking decks of cards
on the table, both showing as top card an Ace of Spades.
“These are ordinary 52-card decks. The first came directly
from the factory—I just carefully removed the cellophane
wrapper. As for the second, I shuffled it many times, and
then continued shuffling until I got that ace back on top.
Can you tell me the entropy of the two decks?” I reply,
“The entropy of the first deck is 1, since only the default
ordering—Ace of Spades, 2, 3, . . . , Queen, King of Spades,
and so forth for the other three suits—matches your descrip-
tion. The entropy of the second is of course 51 factorial. In
fact, the top card clearly happens to be an Ace of Spades,
and from what you told me any ordering of the remaining
51 card remains possible.”
“Excellent,” my friend replies. “While I make some tea,
please go through the decks yourself to verify your answers.”
I diligently leaf through the two decks. Indeed, the first
deck displays the standard ordering, while the second re-
veals, besides the top ace, a haphazard arrangement—but
I note that the King of Hearts still immediately follows the
Queen of Hearts.
“Was my description correct?” my colleague asks. “Yes,”
I reply, “Everything that I saw agrees with it.” “Then,”
he asks, “can you tell me their entropies again?” “As far
as I’m concerned,” I reply, “the entropy is 1 for the first
deck and . . . 1 for the second deck as well!” “Wait— you
changed your mind about the second deck?” “Of course, my
mind has literally changed—I definitely saw with my eyes—
and even made a point of memorizing—what the specific
ordering of the second deck was. Of course no other ordering
would match it!”
We meet again a month later. He smiles and asks, “What
did you say the entropy of the second deck was?” “It was 1,”
I answer, “but as far as I am concerned, today its entropy
is 50 factorial—or 1×50×1×49! ” “And why so?” “In a
month, I forgot all about it—except that it started with
an Ace of Spades and that the King of Hearts followed his
Queen.”
3That is, without going into measure theory, whose whole worry is
about problems caused by infinities.
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That leaves just 1 possibility for the first card; only 50 possible po-
sitions for the Queen out of the remaining 51, to make room for the
King right after her; only 1 possible position for the King, that is,
right after the Queen. As for the 49 cards that are left, they may
come in any order.
“You mean your entropy started with 51 factorial, then
went down to 1, and now is up to 50 factorial—and all that
while the deck itself was not changing a bit?” “Exactly—
“my” entropy, as you say. That is, the best description of
the deck I could give myself, moment by moment, as I went
through this comedy.
The morale of this story is that the entropy “of a
system”—that is, of a description of it—maintained by me
or any other agency—may evolve not only when the system
itself evolves (say, somebody cut the deck) but also while
the system itself remains unchanged. It may increase, if I
lose or forget information about it. Even if I’m very care-
ful, it may increase if I know that the system itself is non-
deterministic (see §8.4). It may decrease, if I receive any
information about the system that allows me to arrive at a
more detailed picture of its makeup, or if I directly “peek”
into it (see §7.5 and [18]). As we shall see, there are also
systems whose entropy will honestly decrease “all by itself,”
even if the system is perfectly isolated and no one peeks!
The second law of thermodynamics is valid for any honest
kind of description of certain distinguished kinds of system
(see §7, and especially table (16), “invertible” column); as
a special case, it strictly applies to physics—as claimed by
Clausius.
To help turn the above intuitive considerations and as-
surances into something more definite—stuff that you can
trust because you created it yourself —in the next section we
shall introduce dynamical systems, that is, systems whose
state evolves in time by well-specified internal laws.
Using dynamical systems as a tool we shall fasten the
patient to the operating table, as it were. By excising in-
tervening layers of fat and connective tissue, we’ll lay bare
with surgical precision the contractual essence of the second
law of thermodynamics (§7).
6 Tracking entropy
When I want to read a book, I write one!
—Benjamin Disraeli 1868
The best way to learn a subject is to write a book about
it.
—Robert Baden–Powell, the founder of Boy Scouts, who
morphed in this way, for pedagogical purposes, the pre-
vious quote
If I can’t picture it, I can’t understand it.
—ttributed to Albert Einstein by John Wheeler
What I cannot create, I do not understand.
—Richard Feynman 1998, scrawled on a blackboard
shortly before his death
What I cannot build, I cannot understand.
—Craig Venter 2010, inscribed as a trademark on the
first synthetic working genome—in the belief he was lit-
erally quoting Feynman
The above five quotations are a partial list of responses I got when I
asked my brain “You know, that quote about how ‘one needs to touch
it with hand to understand it’.” That provides a lower bound of 5 to
the entropy (in the present sense) of my clue.
By the way, I realize that the best way to learn about entropy is to
write a paper about it.
6.1 Dynamical systems
A dynamical system is an abstraction of a mechanical sys-
tem that can be in any one of a set of internal states, and
is governed by an internal rule given once and for all—
external interventions or “miracles” are not allowed! Think
of a music box or a planetary system (or, for that matter,
a planetarium show or a billion-year computer simulation
of the solar system—such as the one performed by Gerry
Sussman and Jack Wisdom’s “digital orrery”[27]).
If the rule makes the system “hop” directly from one
state to the next, without going through a continuum of
intermediate states (contrast a digital to an analog watch),
the system is discrete. We shall set no upper limit to the
number of states that a discrete system may have available.
Moreover, though not essential for our arguments, it will
help intuition and simplify the presentation to assume that
the actual number of states, even though as large as desired,
be finite.
A system is deterministic if its rule associates to each
state a single successor state.4 For any chosen inital state,
iteration of the rule produces, one after the other, a se-
quence of states called the trajectory from that initial state.
In this sense, the rules embodies the dynamics—or the
“behavior—of the system for all possible initial conditions.
For the moment we shall restrict our attention to dynam-
ical systems qualified by the above four properties, namely,
(i) internal rules fixed once and for all, (ii) time-discrete,
(iii) finite-state, and (iv) deterministic.
Thus, for us a system will consist simply of a finite set of
elements called states and a law or rule that to each state
assigns, as a next state or successor, an element from the
same set. For example, the state set S may consist of just
the four states a, b, c, d (i.e.,S = {a, b, c, d}); and the rule R,
which must assign to each element of S its successor, may
be an arbitrary lookup table such as that on the left of (5),
or its graphic equivalent—a state-transition diagram—on
the right.
R−→
a b
b c
c d
d b
a b
cd
(5)
This state-transition diagram is a directed graph where
nodes denote states and whose outgoing arcs point to a
node’s successor. As we’ve seen, in a deterministic system
each node has a single successor; however, a node may well
have more than one predecessor (like b, which has two), or
4That is, if the rule is a function from the state set to iself.
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even none (like a). A node may be its own successor, in
which case the arc coming out of it loops back to it.
Since in ordinary scientific speech “state of a system”
may often mean (especially in physics) a description of its
makeup vague enough to leave room for several individual
states, as in the “hit-and-run car” example of §5, when
necessary for clarity we may refer to the individual elements
of the state set as ur-states (“fundamental” or “atomic”
states).
Note that what should be considered an ur-state is not a given, ul-
timate, intrinsic feature of a system. It is, at bottom, a modeling
decision—what in logic is called a premise (§8.3)—made for the pur-
pose of evaluating its consequences. Thus, the entropy of a deck of
cards discussed in the example of §5 is based on the number of permu-
tations of an ideal, indestructible deck consisisting of discrete symbols
like ‘K♠’ and ‘Q♣’, regardless of, say a card’s orientation or smell.
After a zillion shuffles this ideal deck will be just as new, with its
unblemished 52! ur-states, while a real deck will have been reduced
to a pile of dust by continual wear and tear: billions of tiny specks
susceptible to astronomically more permutations—and not even these
are ultimate states of matter!
In the rest of this section, where ur-states are represented
by nodes in a graph, we may call them simply nodes.
6.2 Day 1: Look! It’s conserved!
Let’s imagine that you keep a dynamical system well-
guarded in your room. I’m in a separate room, and we
comunicate only by intercom.
You: I have here a discrete dynamical system consisting of
ten states labeled 0 through 9. I am going to select one
of these as an initial node, and then I’ll make the system
take a few steps—that is, successively move from one
node to the next according to the system’s rule. Your
task will be to identify the node in which the system is
left at the end of this. Is that clear?
Me: Yes! But aren’t you going to tell me what the actual
system is—what rules it obeys?
You: Oops! I’d forgotten. Let me fax you the entire tran-
sition diagram—it has nodes to represent states and arcs
leading from each node to the next. (faxes diagram of
Fig. 1a) Got it? OK! Now I’ve chosen an initial node
and put a check mark next to it. Tell me what node it
is.
(a) (b) t=0
Figure 1: (a) A dynamical system, in (b) an initial state.
Me: How would I know? It could be any of the ten.
You: That’s right—I haven’t told you which one I’ve cho-
sen. Even though I know what node I have chosen for
the initial node, and so the entropy of my description
(how many nodes the system could possibly be in after
I’d made my choice) equals 1, nonetheless the entropy of
your description—your “knowledge state” given what
you’ve been told so far (and you can’t see my check
mark)—is still “any of them ten.”
Now I tell you what initial node I’ve chosen: it’s
5 (your entropy as to the initial state must surely be 1
now). My command “Step!” will mean I advance the
system’s node by one step. Are you ready? Then let’s
start!
Me: Just a moment! (puts a checkmark next to initial node
5, for the record, and places a movable token on the node
itself, as in Fig. 1b) OK, shoot!
You: Step!
Me: (advances the token by one step; the token is now on
node 4 ) OK!
You: Step! Step! Got it?
Me: Fine! (advances the token two more times)
You: Take four steps this time! I’m done. What’s my final
state?
Me: (takes four more steps on the graph and draws a dotted
line on the diagram to trace the token’s entire trajectory,
as in Fig. 2; the token has landed on node 8 ) You must
be now on node 8!
You: Exactly! And I see that your entropy is still 1—you
have no doubts about which state my system is in now,
even though you don’t see it!
t = 7
Figure 2: Final state (after seven steps) of the given law.
*****
A little later—same setting.
You: This time I’m not going to tell you exactly which
node I’ve chosen as the initial state—just that it is one
of these: {1, 4, 7, 9}. Ready?
Me: Just a moment! (marks nodes 1, 4, 7, 9 on his dia-
gram, for the record, and places a token on each, as in
Fig. 3a) Then my initial entropy is 4. I guess I’ll have
to treat the four initial nodes as separate cases, and at
every step advance the four tokens “in parallel.” Why
not? it’s pretty much like if I were managing four game
boards at once. Go ahead, shoot!
You: Step! Step!
Me: (carefully moves each of the four tokens two steps for-
ward, all on the same diagram sheet) OK—but don’t go
too fast!
You: Now just do nine more steps—take your time! That
will be all.
Me: (is done after a little while, and at the end also records
the final arrangement of tokens on his worksheet—as
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in Fig. 3b) The final state may be any of these nodes:
{3, 4, 5, 6}
(a) t=0 (b) t=11
Figure 3: Initial (t=0) and final (t=11) state of the same
system, but run with four tokens.
You now invite me to your room to compare the outcome
of my “duplicate play” with the final state of the “master
play” in your room. The results agree, in the sense that (a)
the final resting place of your (single) token matches one of
the (four) places that are covered by a token in my board,
and (b) there are no more tokens on my board than would
be necessary to guarantee that result for any of the initial
nodes you’d stated as possible!
Also, I remark that in this case as well my entropy at
the end of my “remote-control” performance is still equal
to that of the initial state. (Of course it then collapsed from
4 to 1 as soon as I saw your actual final node.)
*****
t=0
Figure 4: Blank system template and, on its right, an initial
state consisting of a fully-filled template.
Still later—same setting.
You: Look, I’m tired of choosing initial states. Let’s say
that I may start from any node. Ready?
Me: (dutifully marks all ten nodes as possible candidates
for the initial state, and covers each with a token, for a
total of ten tokens, as in Fig. 4) I’m ready!
You: Then I’d like you to take eleven steps of it!
Me: I will—but with all these tokens it’s going to take a
while! (moves each of the ten tokens one step forward)
One! (a second step) Two! . . . (notices that in spite
of all that bustle nothing has changed as a result; looks
again at the state diagram; then, in a flash of under-
standing) Done!
What’s happened? By inspecting the state diagram of this
particular dynamical system, I noticed that it consists of
just loops, or closed trajectories. Not only does each node
have exactly one successor, but also exactly one predeces-
sor ! Thus it never happens that two arcs flow into the
same node, or that a node has no inlets at all. The dy-
namics (i.e.,the system’s “next state!” law) is a one-to-one
correspondence; in other words, it is invertible. That is,
you could go backwards and unambiguously retrace your
steps by following the arcs backwards. When stepping for-
ward on this diagram, a “platoon” of n tokens occupying
n distinct nodes will invariably land again on n distinct
nodes—there are no “merges” of trajectories, no piling-ups
of tokens onto the same node. The number of occupied
nodes—the entropy of the platoon’s “footprint”—does not
change as the platoon advances—no matter whether by one
step or one billion, or whether you start with a single token
(an ur-state), a small patrol of tokens, or a whole platoon! If
we take “entropy” to mean “amount of information,” an in-
vertible rule is (ach!) informationlossless—whether the sys-
tem’s description is precise (it pinpoints a single ur-state)
or vague (leaves one uncertain as to which of a set of many
ur-states).
In the present case, since all nodes were occupied by a
token at the beginning of the evolution, as in Fig. 4, they
will remain so after each step. Since my task is to record, on
the basis of the initial description and the number of steps
taken afterwards, the nodes possibly occupied now, and all
nodes are “possibly occupied” at the start, the conclusion
is that all nodes are possibly occupied at any time. In sum,
even as the tokens advance, their occupation pattern does
not change at all with time—and that’s why I can announce
the final distribution instantly!
By the way, if in spite of the movement of tokens the
overall token pattern is found to be the same at the end of
each step, then this pattern is called an equilibrium state—
another way of saying time-invariant or time-independent.
6.3 A “poor man’s” MaxEnt principle?
Note that, in any of these duplicate plays, I strive to cover
with tokens every node for which I had some reason to think
that they (but no others) might be occupied in your master
play—as remarked at the end of Day 1’s second dialogue
(Fig. 3). What is the rationale for that?
In the Jaynes entry of §4, we saw that the MaxEnt prin-
ciple is but the implementation, in a statistical context, of
a witness’s categorical imperative of honesty (“the whole
[ascertainable] truth and nothing but the truth”).
But in the present lean-entropy context, where no statis-
tics has yet been introduced, the only tool that forecasters
have at their disposal to implement that categorical im-
perative, in organizing and updating their evidence, is the
blunter “all-or-nothing” of logic. Here, the “whole truth
and nothing but the truth” clause is simply expressed by
a sum of minterms, ie, by the logic oring of and clauses;
one may call this approach MaxMin. The result is a sub-
set of the set of all conceivable ur-states (aka ‘outcomes’),
or, equivalently, the characteristic function of that subset,
which assigns to each outcome the stark choice between 1
and 0 (for ‘currently possible’ and ‘currently not possible’).
Contrast this with a probability distribution, which may
assigns to each outcome a weight anywhere between 0 and
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1: for the same honest intention, if you are given finer tools
you may get sharper results.
What I want to stress is that the MaxEnt principle is not
sacred: the ultimate criterion is that of honesty, of which
MaxEnt is a derivative—the best implementation made pos-
sible by a certain kind of evidence and certain updating (or
“evidence propagation”) tools. Even when the introduc-
tion of statistics will enable us to use MaxEnt instead of
the present MaxMin, we may still not be doing the theo-
retical best in our inference task. That can only come by
tracking the progress of ur-states by literally applying to the
ur-state set the “ur-law” that maps ur-states to ur-states—
no matter whether the state of a system is described as
a single ur-state; by a subset of ur-states or a probability
distribution over the set of ur-states; or other reasonable
means. This concern is captured by the concept of internal
entropy, defined in the next section.
6.4 Internal entropy
The morale of Day 1’s dialogs is the theorem5 that
the internal entropy
of an invertible dynamical system
is constant:
it never decreases or increases.
(6)
What’s this “internal entropy” stuff? Just a physicist’s
shorthand for what we’ve been practicing in the last three
pages—that is, entropy as tracked by a certain kind of disci-
pline. Namely, given a description (a collection of ur-states)
of a system’s initial state, internal entropy is the entropy
(the ur-state count) of this descriptions as it evolves strictly
on the basis of a complete characterization of the subse-
quent transformations—how many steps and of which law.
At present, a state is described as a collection of ur-states,
and, if the law is a many-to-one mapping (as in the dialog of
§6.5), when two or more trajectories merge we shall apply
the “MaxMin” honesty criterion (see §6.3): the new occupa-
tion contents of a node is the or (or logic sum) of the con-
tents of the predecessor nodes. But the above definition of
internal entropy applies just as well to probability-weighted
ur-states, in which case a merging of trajectories gives as
a resulting weight the arithmetic sum of the predecessors’
weights.
What I termed “internal entropy” is often loosely called
“microscopic” or “fine-grained” entropy. The latter terms
are a historical legacy—they have nothing to do with very
small systems per se. What can there be of microscopic
about, say, a deck of cards? On the other hand, as this deck
evolves according to the dynamics of, say, a zero-person soli-
tary game, in which the player has no choice about how to
move since all the moves are forced by the rule—and we
are thus dealing with a dynamical system, its entropy (as a
measure of my best achievable current description) evolves
as well. This ideal process of accounting for entropy evolu-
tion is uniquely determined by the “internals” of the system
(i.e.,the objective rules of the solitary game), and not by any
5The dialog itself is what one might call a “proof by example with-
out loss of generality.”
demands or happenings “external” to the system, like my
(possibly non-ideal) accounting.
“If a tree falls in a forest and I was listening to my iPod full-blast, does
the tree make a sound?” I may swear I heard no sound. But, in falling,
the tree left marks that in principle any one can later investigate
to determine what happened in the forest. If sufficient efforts are
made, different investigators will come to the same conclusions, thus
reconstructing an objective “internal” happening independent of my
subjective, possibly faulty, “external” testimony.
In brief, internal entropy is that whose changes are wholly
determined by the ur-state transitions prescribed by a sys-
tem’s rule. Note that from the present viewpoint, in agree-
ment with Clausius’s intuition, internal-entropy changes are
to be associated with transformations. External-entropy
changes (discussed in §7 ff.) are also associated with tran-
formations, but of a different kind.
The key feature of internal entropy is the assumption of
complete knowledge of the rules—such as the transition di-
agram of the above dialogs—as they apply to the system’s
ur-states. It doesn’t matter instead whether a description
of the state of the system is fine or coarse—whether it pin-
points a ur-state (as in the first dialog), leaves open a num-
ber of possibilities (a “cloud” of ur-states, as in the second
dialog), or is totally vacuous (as in the third).
Once we know the rule, we can in principle precisely ap-
ply it to any individual ur-state. The collective makeup of
an ur-state cloud—which represents the ambiguity of our
state of knowledge—is irrelevant ; and so is (in principle)
the amount of labor needed to apply the law to every ur-
state.
Note that the token-pushing labor can be distributed among many
workers and performed by them concurrently, independent of one an-
other, since tokens do not interact. As a matter of fact, in certain
situations the image of a cloud of tokens crowded over a single state-
diagram may not have adequate expressive power (see §6.6). To play it
safe, one should always imagine using as many instances of the game
board—as many identical copies of the state diagram—as there are
tokens, and have each token run all by itself on its own board (see
§8.5).
6.5 Day 2: It goes down!
(a) (b) t = 0
Figure 5: (a) Another dynamical system, with initial state
(b).
You: I just faxed you a new dynamical system—same ten
states as the old, but the arcs are different (see Fig. 5a).
Wanna play a game?
Me: Sure! What’s up?
You: I’m asking you to tell me! I suspect there may be
something different. Let me describe the initial state as
“an odd number.”
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Me: You mean, any of {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}? I’ll have to use five to-
kens. (see Fig. 5b) Let me make your system go through
a few steps and I’ll tell you what happens.
You: Go ahead!
Me: Well, on the first step the token moved forward like so:
9→ 4, 7→ 3, 5→ 2, 3→ 1, and 1→ 0. The occupancy
is now {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}; the entropy level has remained at
5. Incidentally, the rule seems to be “divide by two and
throw away the remainder.”
You: Take one more step!
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Same at times 1 and 2. In (a), both tokens 2 and
3 prepare to land on node 1, and both 1 and 0 on node 0!
Me: One moment! While the token on node 4 (see Fig. 6a)
wants to go on node 2, both 3 and 2 want to go to 1,
and both 1 and 0 to 0. What shall I do with this paired
tokens?—allow a double occupancy and place them both
on their destination node?
You: The way we’ve been using tokens so far is to tell,
“Given the system’s dynamics and the description of its
initial state, there is a possibility that the system will
be on this node.” With this interpretation at least, it
doesn’t make a difference if you move both tokens to the
node they want to occupy, or put only one token there
and take the other off the board.
Me: I’ll do the former—in all these “overbooking” cases
I’ll “put two or more passengers in the same seat!” (see
Fig. 6b) Now there are tokens only at {2, 1, 0}; entropy
has dropped from 5 to 3.
You: Go on. Step! Step! Step!
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Same after steps 3 and 4. By now, all tokens have
flown into node 0,
Me: Occupancy dwindled down first to {1, 0}, then to just
{0}—and that’s where things will remain from now on.
In fact, once a token has reached node 0, in one step it
will cycle back to 0—and so on forever! It will never go
off the board! Entropy went down to 2, then to 1, and
now it is stuck there.
node state occupation
9 •
8
7 •
6
5 •
4 •
3 • •
2 • •
1 • • • •
0 • • • • •
entropy 5 5 3 2 1 1
t −→ 0 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 8: (left) Rearranged transition diagram to highlight
the partial ordering of states. (right) Time graph of node
occupation and corresponding entropy.
You: So there were steps when the entropy didn’t change;
and others when it went down; but none when it went
up?
Me: That’s right, the entropy of your system monotoni-
cally decreases as time goes on, and I can prove it! In
this diagram here (see Fig. 8 left) I rearranged nodes
and arcs to make explicit this inexorable march of
events.
You: That’s strange . . . physicists say that internal en-
tropy can never decrease: if it did, one could exploit
that to turn waste heat into useful mechanical work—
to make a perpetual-motion machine! What is different
with this system?
Me: Well, physics is a special case, since its fundamental
laws—whether in the classical or quantum-mechanical
formulation—are believed to be strictly invertible. But
the new system you gave me to play with is not invert-
ible! (reassuringly) Don’t be embarrassed—I hear that
the noninvertible ones are actually the majority!
You: I’m satisfied with your explanation. But physi-
cists also maintain that entropy keeps increasing all the
time—only in ideal circumstances does it remain con-
stant. Yet in invertible systems, as we saw in Day 1,
internal entropy is strictly constant, and in noninvert-
ible ones it sometimes goes down. Between invertible
and noninvertible—that takes care of all systems, and
so leaves no room for entropy ever to go up. It seems
that the difficulty is how to make entropy go up rather
than down! How do physical systems manage the trick
of letting entropy increase in spite of their being gov-
erned, as you just said, by invertible laws?
6.6 Day 3: It goes up!
Today you walk into my room with a glum face.
You: My fax machine is broken. But I still don’t want
you to peek into the system in my room—after all you
are supposed to make forecasts, not reports. In lieu of
faxing, I will chalk the transition table on a slate and
give that to you.
Me: Fine with me!
You: (scribbles on the slate) Here is the system’s dynam-
ics! Can you run seven steps of it? Start with {4, 7, 9}
as the initial state. . . . Now—I’m sorry—I have to go
see my doctor. I’ll be back after lunch.
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t=0
Figure 9: (a) A new dynamical system, and an initial state
for it.
I pick up the slate (Fig. 9). On it there is a graph with
ten nodes and ten arcs—as in the previous two days. I mark
nodes {4, 7, 9} as the initial state and place one token on
each. The inital entropy is clearly 3.
1 2 3
Figure 10: A problem in stepping between times 2 and 3:
the two arcs from nodes 0 and 2 run so close to one another
(where indicated by the small dotted circle at time 2) that’s
hard to see whether they run alongside one another or cross
paths.
I observe that no two arcs converge onto the same node,
so the system is invertible—as that of Day 1. I run two
steps without any problems. But at the third step I see a
problem: When one of my tokens happens to be on node 0,
as at time 2 of Fig. 10, its outgoing arc at a certain point
runs so close to that coming out of node 2 that’s hard for
me (I left my reading glasses at home) to tell whether at
that point the two arcs run alongside each other or cross. In
my case, if the two arcs run parallel my token move should
be 0 → 4; if they cross, 0 → 7. Note that the ambiguity
in this scenario is not as to which node, as when we gave a
choice of several nodes for the initial state, but as to which
destination accroding to the rule—whether the transition
table for node 0 says 0→ 4 or 0→ 7.
Since my task is to determine, at every step, on what
nodes there can be a token—that is, which system states
are possible according to the information I have—the best I
can do at the moment is entertain both possibilities at once
for the token now leaving node 0, by placing tokens on both
possible destinations—nodes 4 and 7.
My approach means, in substance, “when in doubt, track
the consequences of all plausible alternative hypotheses.”
When a “game” is played as a response to a real-life challenge, a
token may mark, say, one of the places where a terrorist might be
at the moment—remember the hit-and-run story? At the next step
of the game that position is updated, say, according to the presumed
speed of the vehicle and the nature of the terrain—and that is done
“in parallel” for all alternative routes that terrorist may have taken.
The rationale for choosing to act that way runs much like this. Sup-
pose I forgot where I left my glasses and I have to instruct somebody
to go get them for me. I am to give them a list of places where they
should look. If one place which comes to my mind is not after all so
likely, should I include it? If I do, the errand will take a little longer6
If I don’t include it, and the glasses actually happen to be in that un-
likely place, then my helper will come back after the longest possible
time (having gone through all the places in the list) and still return
empty-handed, adding, as it were, insult to injury! I’d rather play it
safe.
4 5 6 7
Figure 11: The same problem at times 5 and 6—are the
paths from nodes 0 and 2 crossing or running parallel? But
at time 5 there is a token at both nodes, and so it doesn’t
matter which goes where. At time 6, however, only one
token is present, and which way it goes matters.
I go all the way through the remaining four steps
(Fig. 11). At time 5 I have a similar problem as at time
2 (Fig. 10), but now both nodes at the head of the converg-
ing arcs have a token, so it doesn’t matter whether the two
arcs cross or go along. At time 6, only one token is present,
at node 2, and again—as at time 2—the token at node 2
is confronted with two alternative paths and “in doubt” it
takes both. I have now five tokens!
You come back from the doctor.
You: Well, how did it go? Where are your tokens now?
Me: At nodes {1, 4, 5, 7, 9}; the entropy is now 5.
You: How can that be? I’m sure I had given you an invert-
ible system, and thus the entropy should have remained
constant. Or perhaps you believed I had given you five
alternative nodes for the initial state?
Me: No, I know you only gave me three. But, owing to its
poor readability, the graph you’d given me confronted
me with two alternative routings. Effectively, instead of
a single law I had two alternative laws to deal with. I
did my best, and kept both alternative universes alive.
My final number of tokens represents the logic or—
the “merge”—of tokens from two parallel universes after
seven steps of running.
You: I guess you did your best—all this is very helpful.
Thank you! In fact—please hang around—I have one
more task in mind for you!
Note that the or operation (the “merge” of token patterns) is a hack—
a simple but not necessarily the best way to extract a token count from
the parallel evolution of a number of universes.
Here we’ve seen one way that entropy can go up. From
Day 1 to Day 3 nothing has changed with the nature of
the system’s law or of its initial state, but an accident of
6Or merely just as long, if they find my glasses before looking at
that place.
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misplaced reading glasses prevented me from making out
one bit of the law itself—“Do these two paths cross or
run through side-by-side?” During the step where one to-
ken went through that juncture, the “internal law” that
governed the movement of your tokens had not changed—
specifically, it was still invertible—but because of some “ex-
ternal perturbation” my description of it went through a
“forked path.” To represent the two alternative universes,
my hack was to duplicate the token while remaining on a
single game board. As a variant of that, I could instead have
cut the token in half and let the two halves follow separate
courses. The most conservative solution—I use that term
literally—would have been to duplicate the whole setup,
board and tokens, at the very beginning, when I realized I
didn’t have my glasses; use the “across” variant of the law
for one setup and the “along” variant for the other; and
proceed with the simulation on both boards. Later, when
I found my glasses, I would have resolved the doubt and
accordingly simply discarded the wrong variant.
You may argue, “What a waste of resources!” But this is exactly what
is done today by employing speculative execution in microprocessors,
where for the sake of reducing latency a computer system performs
some task that may later turn out not to be needed. When the cpu
encounters a conditional statement—“if 〈condition〉 then do 〈this〉
else 〈that〉,” and the value—true or false—of the condition is not
yet known, it starts running through both “horns” of the dilemma—
〈this〉 and 〈that〉—in parallel, using extra resources provided for the
purpose. Some time later, when the condition’s value is known, one
horn is lopped off and the resources already spent on it go down the
drain. In this way we save time, since the “right” answer starts being
computed (together with the “wrong” one) before the condition is
known—but at the price of “haste makes waste!”
No matter what hack I use, my accounting of the process
becomes in effect nondeterministic (see §8.4). Note I was
careful not to say “stochastic” or “probabilistic”—that is, I
didn’t give weights to the two alternatives (that would be a
higher-level hack, touched on briefly in §8.3). Fact is, what
kind of forensic analysis of the slate could have told me the
odds of “across” vis-a`-vis “along?” In all honesty, I could
only say
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And I traveled both,
And described to you both of them.
Now you choose—I was only a bookkeper!
*****
A little later that afternoon.
You: Sorry for that smudgy slate! To make up for it, as I
was coming back from the doctor’s I typed on my laptop
the rule for the system I gave you this morning—and a
new set of initial conditions. The data are here on this
usb memory stick. Can you please run the experiment
again?
Me: Sure! But right now I have to pick up my daughter
and stay with her through soccer practice. I’ll be back
in three hours.
You: Fine! I can wait—I got plenty of stuff to do myself.
After the embarrassment of missing my reading glasses,
I feel a bit paranoid. So before leaving I put the mem-
ory stick inside a very-high-resolution particle detector—
I’ve read that “electronic memory performance is highly
affected by cosmic rays.”
When I come back, I analyze the content of the memory
stick and see that the set of initial nodes reads {4, 7, 9}.
However, I discover that unfortunately one high-energy
gamma-ray has hit the chip, passing through the least-
significant bit of the memory word where that number 4
is stored. Typically, if anything happened at all, that bit
would have been cleared—i.e.,for this kind of memory, been
forced to the value 0. So the least-significant bit of that 4
(0100 in binary), which now reads 0, may originally have
been a 0 as now, or may have started out as a 1 and then
been turned into a 0 by the cosmic ray. So, even if that
bit had not been changed by the ray, I still don’t know
whether what now spells 4 was originally a 4 or a 5. In
doubt, I’ll have to count both 4 and 5 among the possible
initial nodes—in addition to the other three nodes in the
given list.7
Well, you can guess the rest now. The description you
wrote in the memory stick certainly had an initial entropy
of 4, because there were only four entries in your initial-
state set. The gamma-ray accident forced me to augment
this set to {4, 5, 7, 9}—entropy 5. The law is clearly leg-
ible and the system is indeed invertible, so that—barring
new accidents—the entropy will remain at 5 forever. How-
ever, at some time during my entire accounting process the
entropy has increased from 3 to 4 in spite of the system’s
being invertible.
7 The second law
The morale of Day 3’s dialogs (§6.6) is that
the honest entropy
of an invertible dynamical system
never decreases, but it may increase.
(7)
What? What happened to the morale of Day 1? (top
of §6.4) Are we in Orwell’s Animal Factory after the pigs’
takeover? There, the cherished slogan painted on the barn’s
wall—which every barn animal remembered as
all animals are equal
—was one day found augmented to
all animals are equal
b ut s ome are m ore equal than others.
What has changed? Well, the new morale speaks of “hon-
est” entropy, not of “internal” entropy. If we want to turn
morale (7) from a mere afterthought over the two isolated
thought experiments of Day 3’s dialogs into a general theo-
rem, we’ll have to properly define “honest entropy.”
7Of course, if a 5 was already present in that list I would have
concluded that the affected node must indeed have been a 4 to begin
with, and not added a second 5 to the list.
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7.1 Honest entropy as a contract
Here we shall first motivate and then define honest entropy.
By proposing such a definition, my goal is to capture the
most natural (and plausibly a most generally useful) con-
cept of entropy, if there were such a thing; if not, to help
shape one. As we shall see (§8), our definition will natu-
rally extend to the standard entropy context. Our defini-
tion applies not only to the updating of a description by a
deterministic law, but also to the case of a nondeterministic
law, regardless of whether the state of a system is given as
a subset of ur-states or a probability distribution.
The nature of honest entropy reflects a contract much
like that between an executive and a consultant. The ex-
ecutive has the power to decide how to use his institution’s
resources for the institution’s greater good, but may not
not be sure of the consequences of a given decision. So he
decides to set aside some of those resources to hire a con-
sultant to quickly estimate the actual consequences that a
hypothetical decision taken now will have in two years.
The consultant will set up and run at 100× speed (two
years to a week) a simplified version of the world which
mimics essential aspects of the problem at hand. For the
reason presented in §8.3, this will typically be a probabilistic
model, consisting of (a) an initial probability distribution
over a set of ur-states, and (b) a law describing its evolution
in time. (A lean-entropy model, as indicated in §6.3, will
do as well).
This is fine conceptually, but in practice the ur-states
are vastly too many to be treated one-by-one. In fact the
number of ur-states grows exponentially with the system’s
amount of detail—the number of its parts or features.
If my Social Security has “only” 9 pieces—its nine digits—that
nonetheless means that the Social Security Administration must be
ready to handle up to a billion files!
The ur-state of even a simplified model of something like
the weather or the market may easily run in the billions of
digits, alphabetic characters, or pixels; a liter of gas may
have 1024 parts—and the number of ur-states is an exponen-
tial of that ! While it may still be practical to determine the
successor of a single ur-state and iteratively follow it along
its orbit, a fully general distribution consists of the weights
of all the ur-states, and thus has as much bulk as the entire
ur-state set. Only distributions that can be represented in
a compact way owing to special properties can be handled,
and only evolution rules that can themselves take advan-
tage of those special properties can be applied; that is, the
restrictions in the nature of a distribution also restrict what
the dynamics itself can express. Thus, one should strive to
retain a dynamics that can easily carry over across an evo-
lution step at least those correlations (between parts of the
model) that are of critical relevance.
In sum, the limited resources available force the consul-
tant to drastically condense, and thus severely approximate,
both the static description of the “state of the world” (as
far as the executive’s query is concerned) and its dynamics.
In light of the circumstances, this may still be an honest
manner to proceed on the consultant’s part.
Within a week, the consultant delivers his forecast for the
“state of the world” two years from now—and presents his
invoice. How is our executive to determine if the contract
was indeed fulfilled and that the product is worth its cost?
To be concrete, suppose that one element of the forecast
were the market price of gold—as of two years from now.
By its nature, the model will give for this price a probability
distribution, typically approximating a normal distribution,
with a certain mean (say, $1,301/oz) and a certain standard
deviation or spread, say, ±$700/oz. Now, such a spread is
so large as to make the whole forecast business virtually
worthless, because anyone could have told that “somewhere
between $600/oz and $2,000/oz” is practically a sure bet—
no need to pay a consultant!
Would then our executive accept without a qualm a fore-
cast of $1,301±1/oz? With such an unbelievably narrow
spread, he should sue the consultant for fraud and ask the
court to immediately impound all his records: there aren’t
enough resources on entire planet to grant such a sharp
prediction!
From the above discussion one can begin to tease out
rational terms of contract for engaging a forecasting con-
sultant, along the following lines:
1. The principal of the contract will have the option to
engage an auditor to monitor the performance of the
contract, from its onset (including setting up and run-
ning the model) up to one year after the forecast’s ob-
ject date.
2. No limits shall be set by the contractor to the amount
of resources granted to the auditor for his task.
3. All the data and procedures used by the contractor
during the performance shall be made available to the
auditor, and documented in such a way as to make the
entire contract execution repeatable at will. Rationale
and aims of unusual or ad hoc data-processing proce-
dures should be clearly stated.
4. The auditor shall not disclose any of the intellectual
property originated by the contractor during the per-
formance, except as evidence of breach of contract.
5. The contractor may be fined for any breaches of book-
keeping and/or accounting rules, as indicated by the
auditor, in the following matters:
6. Random error. If, at any stage of the performance,
simplifications or approximations of the model are in-
troduced, or the model is affected by accidental dis-
turbances, or just exposed to such disturbances, a de-
tailed record of such events and exposures shall be kept.
An upper bound to the entropy gain attendant to any
such disturbance shall be provided independently for
each event, and accumulated into an external entropy
burden, which shall be added to the measurable (by
inspection) “raw entropy” entropy of the final forecast.
At the same time as the auditor is charged with detecting
violations to the above random error clause, it might be ex-
pedient to additionally direct his attention to the following
systematic error clause:
7. Systematic error. If, at any stage of the contract per-
formance, transformations are applied to the model’s
current state that, in light of the current state of the
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modeling art, grossly or unaccountably depart from
the goal of converging toward the desired distribution
mean, such deviations must be reported and accumu-
lated in a qualitative way into an external center-of-
mass burden.
But, rather than with honesty, the latter clause, about
systematic error, has to do with competence—which is much
harder to quantify. As Shannon discovered, among param-
eters that one could use to characterize a transformation,
entropy change sticks out because any administrator with
generic training can routinely determine it—much as he
can determine the number of a candidate’s publications
simply by counting them. More significant aspects of a
transformation—or of a candidate—may require a great
deal of specific expertise to evaluate. Desirable as it may
be in a contract, we shall not include the last desideratum
in the contract that defines honest entropy.
We’ve seen what the entropy of a description is. We’ve
seen how this entropy changes as the description is updated
by the literal application of a certain internal dynamics.
We shall now define the honest entropy of a sequence of
transformations.
Honest entropy. Given a “master” system that starting
from a certain state has undergone a certain number of tran-
formations, an honest entropy change is defined as the com-
puted entropy change of an independently simulated version
of the system, started in an equivalent state and subjected
to equivalent transformations. This equivalence shall be a
mapping of states and transformations of the master system
to those of the simulated system. For any point in which
this mapping is not one-to-one,8 an upper bound to the at-
tendant entropy change shall be assigned and the absolute
value of it shall be added to an entropy burden accumula-
tor. The final value of this entropy burden shall be added
to the difference between final and initial entropies of the
simulated system (which can be determined by inspection).
As for the procedural rules stipulated by the above defini-
tion, I didn’t pull them out of a hat. They essentially reflect
the standard conventions for the propagation of uncertainty
(as in [34], for one) in experimentation, simulation, and cal-
culation.
I have tried to illustrate the rationale of the above pro-
cedural guidelines in the two dialogs of Day 3 (§6.6), where
external events superpose perturbations, or “noise,” on the
internal evolution of a system: in one case on the system’s
rule and in the other on the system’s state. Even though
these events were external to the system proper, honest
dealing with them lead to a smearing of our description of
the system’s state, as compared to what it would have been
by pure internal evolution.
For a familiar example of uncertainty propagation, suppose that in a
numerical simulation one rounds off all numbers to three significant
figures after each updating step. Then 3.14159 becomes 3.14, but
the same value will have been arrived at from any number between
3.135 . . . and 3.145 . . . , with an uncertainty range of 0.01. Thus, even
8It could be n-to-one, as in a homomorphism, or one-to-n, as in a
Monte Carlo simulation, in both cases with a lean-entropy change of
n− 1, but with different signs in the two cases.
though roundoff is a many-to-one mapping, and so naively may seem
to reduce uncertainty, in fact it will have destroyed part of the record,
and thus leave us with an uncertainty range of 0.01 as to the original
content of the record.
If the original number had been 3.14 to begin with, no uncertainty
range—no entropy burden—need be attached to it because of the
roundoff.
Finally, if the same number had been encoded onto an analog signal
subject to a noise level of 0.1, and then turned back to digital form
as—say, 3.22—by A/D conversion, we should associate with the latter
un uncertainty range of 0.1.
Recall that in “internal entropy” the term ‘internal’ does
not refer to an entropy per se, but to a particular discipline
through which an initial description is successively updated
to reflect the effects that a certain sequence of transforma-
tions had on the state of a system. The object of the game
was to give an accurate description of the system’s state at
the end of these transformations.
In an analogous way, in “honest entropy” the term ‘hon-
est’ does not refer to an entropy value per se, but to a
particular discipline used to arrive at it—usually when, as
almost always the case—drastic simplifications are unavoid-
able.
Even within that discpline, an honest entropy is not
unique; it depends on the specific simplification made.
More drastic simplifications represent a coarser approxima-
tion of the system, and thus, when honestly acknowledged,
yield a higher honest entropy. The latter only gives an upper
bound to the entropy one could have arrived at by making
a more accurate simulation of the master system. The best
lower bound, of course, is the internal entropy.
And what is the auditor for? Clearly the uncertainty of
a forecast—its entropy burden—decreases its value, and a
consultant will be tempted not to report the full extent of
it—as we all may be tempted with our tax burden. The
likelihood of an audit should encourage our consultant to
police himself and not push too hard the envelope9 of the
contract.
Any way of massaging or updating a description—even
outright forgery—still leaves a description of sorts. For this
reason, we shall still generally call simply “entropy” the
count of all possible instantiations of that description—as
questionable as the latter’s provenance may be.
Most forms of entropy that are not obtained via the inter-
nal entropy discipline are traditionally called macroscopic
entropy (of which coarse-grained entropy is a special case).
Often a macroscopic entropy is arrived at by a hybrid pro-
cess. That is, the description is first updated by a blind-
reckoning procedure, that is, one computes a few steps of
the evolution of the system from given initial data and a
given law, without access to the system itself. Then one
determines by direct measurement some easily quantified
parameter—usually a global macroscopic parameter such
as mass, temperature, pressure, or the results of a poll; in
other words, one “takes a peek” at the system. Finally,
those two components are combined into a single descrip-
tion, and the entropy of that description is reported. An
example of this is given in §7.5.
9You may be amused to hear that this idiom comes from the mathe-
matics of curves via the lingo of airplane performance limits—nothing
to do with stationery.
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The concept of “macroscopic” in physics is actually a “kitchen sink” of
more-or-less precise intuitions. In Gregg Jaeger’s words, “Macroscop-
icity turns out to be a rather vaguer and less consistently understood
notion than typically assumed by physicists who have not explicitly
explored the notion themselves.”[12] Also, in [11], “Long before the
appearance of the term in quantum theory, consistent standard but
different use of the notion of the macroscopic was made in thermal
physics and statistical mechanics, in reference to the macroscopic vari-
able and in connection with the relationship of the statistics of basic
components to thermodynamical variables, e.g.,temperature and pres-
sure of collections.”
The concept of honest entropy may provide a quality-
control reference point (“here we know what we are talking
about”) in the commerce of macroscopic entropy.
What we shall do next, is present in a discursive way,
always in the context of the present lean-entropy approach
(“entropy-as-a-count,” as defined in §5) an important con-
clusion of the present paper, concerning the relation be-
tween honest entropy and the second law of thermodynam-
ics. We shall briefly revisit the second law after the decon-
struction/reconstruction excursus of §8.
Let us first recall that the second law of thermodynamics,
as formulated by Clausius on empirical grounds, can be
paraphrased as
the entropy of an isolated physical system
never decreases,
(8)
and that it is believed that
the laws of physics are at bottom
strictly invertible.
(9)
Further recall, from theorem (6), that
the internal entropy
of an invertible system
is constant
(10)
(note that the object of internal-entropy bookkeping is al-
ways an isolated system), while from §6.5 we have (as per
Footnote 5) the following theorem:
the internal entropy
of a noninvertible system
never increases
but occasionally does decrease.
(11)
7.2 The weak second law
Let us now run through a trivial exercise of logic. From the-
orems (10) and (11) we obtain a weak second law, namely,
that
a system’s internal entropy is constant
if and only if it is invertible.
(12)
From that law and assumption (9) we get, as a corollary,
that
if a system is physical
it must obey the weak second law
(that is, its internal entropy is constant!)
(13)
We shall as well explicitly state the converse of theorem
(12), namely,
should its internal entropy ever decrease,
the system violates the weak second law
(and therefore must be noninvertible!)
(14)
7.3 The strong second law (important!)
Using an argument formally similar to that used above for
the weak law, but starting from a more practically interest-
ing premise, I’ll arrive at a much stronger conclusion.
What I proclaim, and will just for the moment call the
strong second law of thermodynamics, is none but
a dynamical system’s honest entropy
never decreases
if and only if the system is invertible!
(15)
The proof is is straightforward; it follows directly from the
definition of honest entropy in §7.1 with the help of the
following table
Honest-entropy change through a step
noninvertible invertible
(many-to-one) (one-to-one)
internal ≤ 0(∗) = 0
external noise ≥ 0 ≥ 0
total S 0 ≥ 0
(∗) Strictly less for at least one state transition
(16)
As per this table, at any step the system’s honest entropy
will
• if the system is invertible: remain constant, or increase;
• if the system is noninvertible: decrease, remain con-
stant, or increase; moreover,
• if for some appropriate current state description and
low enough external noise a decrease can occur at all,
then the system is noninvertible. qed
Note the asymmetry between the if and the only if. I
can check that a system is invertible by its law, which is
given to me, and from that I can make nonvacuous predic-
tions about its entropy changes in different circumstances
(noise vs no noise). Similarly, I can check that a system is
noninvertible, by its law, and from that make some nonva-
cuous predictions about its entropy changes.
For the converse, however—that is, if I want to infer
something about the invertibility of the system from the
changes in entropy—the task is made more difficult by the
presence of external noise. If I happen to hit a single state
transition for which the entropy decreases, then, irrespec-
tive of external noise, I can conclude that the system is
noninvertible. However, even if I manage to turn off all
noise, to conclude that the system is invertible merely from
its entropy changes I have to test all possible state tran-
sitions. In the limit as the system’s size goes to infinity,
the experimental determination of invertibility vs nonin-
vertibility on the basis of observed entropy changes (we are
still speaking of entropy of a description) become de facto
only semi -decidable.
Our strong second law has a nice feature. It rec-
onciles Clausius’s sweeping statement, that “the entropy
of the world increases,” based on empirical thermody-
namics near equilibrium, with the statistical mechanical
interpretation—which in certain “non-honest” conditions
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makes room for entropy fluctuations. We owe this reconcil-
iation to the humble honest entropy.
A worked-out example of reconciliation of the paradox—
up-and-down fluctuations vs monotonical increase of an ex-
pected value—is given in §7.5. There, the score of a game
is updated in real-time, while a forecaster updates, also
in real-time, an expected score based only (a) on informa-
tion available at the beginning of the game and (b) just how
many rounds of the game have been played so far—but none
of the actual outcomes. In the actual game, the score may
well go up and down; in these “blind-reckoning” forecasts,
the expected score will monotonically increase if and only
if the system is invertible!
On reflection, all this should not be surprising. Honest
entropy is but an expression of the MaxEnt principle (see
§4, Jaynes entry) in the context of a forecasting context
(where by necessity one must perforce anticipate the state
of a system without seeing it, as the contractor of §7.1), or
whenever such “blind reckoning” is stipulated by the rules
of engagement.
And this is the source of the generality of the strong sec-
ond law of thermodynamics, and by implication, of Clau-
sius’s second law!
7.4 Not a physical law?
In the title of this section (see Myth 7 in the Introduction),
remark that what is emphasized is not “law” or “not,” but
just the word “physical.” Now I shall explain what I mean;
to the cognoscenti of you, this will not come as a surprise.
The surprise, if any, may be that—as in Andersen’s “The
Emperor’s Clothes”—somebody had the naivete´ to say it
aloud!
Every morning a shepherd would take his sheep out of the fold and
every night he would put them back in. Sheep, like kindergarden
children, have a way of getting out of line for any distraction. So
the shepherd had to count and recount his sheep to make sure he
got them all in. This shepherd had an inquisitive mind—and plenty
of time to think. One day he observed, “Isn’t this an interesting
coincidence? When I put seven sheep in the fold, and then three
more, I end up with the same number of sheep as when I start with
three and then add seven.” Our “protoscientist” experiments with
different combinations of sheep numbers, and such a fact always holds
true. “I have discovered a great physical law,” he concludes one day,
“I’ll call it the Second Law of Sheepdynamics!”
I grant the shepherd the independent discovery of a law.
But to call it a physical law? I agree that this law is cor-
rect. Indeed, few things are truer than it—and that’s where
the catch is! By the same token, the cheesemaker will (cor-
rectly) claim that cheese counting obeys a Second Law of
Cheesemaking, and similarly the hot-chestnut seller, a law
of Chestnutroasting. This is of course harmless, but a bit
parochial: will you call those a dairy law and a roasting
law? They are all already subsumed under a Commutative
Law of Addition, and, to paraphrase Ockham, in science
it is just not good manners to introduce more laws than
necessary.
The second law of thermodynamics is at bottom a count-
ing inequality, valid, as we’ve seen in §7.3, for all and only
invertible dynamical systems—be they physical as a gas or
abstract as a Turing machine or a cellular automaton. It
can be thought of as a law of category theory.
As a corollary of that general law, the second law be-
comes a “physical law” on the mere premise that physics be
at bottom an invertible dynamical system. In other words,
as soon as one proposes for physics (say, on the basis of over-
whelming experimental evidence) a model that is at bottom
an invertible dynamics, physics automatically inherits the
second law as an intrinsic property of that model.
In spite of my irreverence, I’m emotionally very attached to the in-
vertible dynamics model of our universe, and I’d place a large bet
on it. However, just to play devil’s advocate, one may argue that
the observed invertibility of microphysics might be just an emergent
property of a noninvertible substrate. For example, in a finite (though
no matter how large) deterministic dynamical system, any trajectory
eventually falls into the attractor of (or “merges with”) a closed or-
bit. The collection of these closed orbits is of course an invertible
system. So, after the system has run for a long time and most of
the merges have occurred (to paraphrase Feyman’s, “When most fast
things have happened”) and the remaining merges are ever rarer and
farther between, the system will be de facto invertible and thus de
facto obey the second law (eventually it will obey it strictly) in spite
of its defining dynamics being noninvertible. I briefly discussed this
devil’s advocate’s counterexample with Feynman in 1981, and he had
no objections to the counterexample per se; the real question was of
course whether such an “aged” system would still have enough stamina
to support, on top and in spite of the aforementioned emergence of
invertibility, complex emergent phenomena like life.
Physicists deserve praise for having been first at identi-
fying and formulating the second law of thermodynamics.
After Boltzmann, however, it must have been clear that this
is a law of enormous generality, and thus belongs to every-
body, not only physicists. It has become public domain!
Incidentally, this law should properly be called a law of thermostatics,
since it does not prescribe a motion, but only forbids motion in certain
directions. In physics, in a course of Statics, one studies when a scale
is at equilibrium. But the principles of statics have something to say
even when a system is not at equilibrium. Namely, they will tell us to
which side the scale will not tip—though not whether, when, or how
fast it will tip to the other side.
Specifically, the second law of thermodynamics is valid for
“any invertible dynamical system from which one is tem-
porarily cut off.” In this sense, it is a law of logic in the form
of information theory. Whenever you forget a bit about a
system’s state, or a tooth slips in your mechanical simu-
lation of it, you are in effect erasing one constraint from
the state’s current description. By the MaxEnt principle,
honesty or self-interest require that, every time you remove
a constraint, you let the distribution that embodies that
description spread out to “fill the slack” and thus remain
MaxEnt.
It turns out that physics does meet the above description.
But a countless variety of other systems do too. On the
other end, if the system is not as defined above—or it does,
but at a certain point you restore your contact with it—-
then this law no longer need apply (see §7.5 for an example).
It is in this sense that I argue that the second law is not a
law of physics per se (such as instead, I suppose, is the first
law—“conservation of energy”), much as the commutation
property of sheep is not a law of shepherding per se.
The second law’s intuitive explanation is that we—a liter
of gas, the weather, etc.—are localized patches of a large,
distributed (roughly, “spread out” rather than “lumped”),
yet interconnected system. In this situation no agency can
have total control of any portion of the universe—and fortu-
nately so! Mice and men may claim a patch of this universe
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as exclusively their own, but their best-laid plans can never
manage to unconditionally isolate and protect it from ex-
ternal influences. The latter may be felt by the claimants
as “random disturbances” (that is, “hard to predict”), even
when they may be a consequence (intended or unintended)
of what other mice and men (or galactic agencies) are quite
deliberately and cognizantly (thus nonrandomly from their
viewpoint) doing with their patches. Or they may simply
be a minor accidental side-effect of the explosion of a dumb
supernova!
In the above paragraph we didn’t explicitly mention ei-
ther physics or invertibility; we just envisioned any large
distributed system with enough coupling (or “interaction
between parts”) to keep it exciting—as long as that lasts.
Politics, economics, and ecology are good examples.
You may object that at that level of aggregation the dy-
namics of a system may no longer be seen as invertible—
even though that of the physical substrate were, and there-
fore there wouldn’t any longer be a guarantee that the sec-
ond principle strictly held. That is true, but if you look
at the right column (noninvertible) of table (16), you will
see that the net entropy change would remain ≥ 0 as long
as the “forking of paths” (§6.6) contributed by the exter-
nal noise—the crowds jostling about you—overwhelmed the
the “merging of paths” (§6.5)—dictated by a noninvert-
ible internal dynamics. The above state of affairs is a very
likely one in almost any conceivable universe, invertible or
not, considering that, if the “noninvertibility” of a system
were too drastic, everything would soon “freeze” and there
wouldn’t be any one left to ask questions. According to
Norman Margolus (personal communication), an invertibile
pinball machine was the Creator’s obvious choice, for it
yields “the most playing time for your quarter!”
7.5 Fluctuations paradoxes; macroscopic
entropy
Since its introduction, the second law has been (and still
is) plagued by objections and paradoxes—chief represen-
tatives of which are the Loschmidt (or reversal) paradox
(Kelvin 1874, Loschmidt 1876), the recurrence paradox
(Zermelo 1896), and the well known Maxwell’s demon para-
dox (Maxwell 1866).
In short, these paradoxes present theoretical or empirical
examples where in the course of time physical entropy would
spontaneously decrease, in violation of the second law. At
the core of these paradoxes there usually is some version of
the mind projection fallacy (see §8.3) where one starts with
a mental construct such as “witchness,” and incorrectly as-
sumes that if there is a “property of being a witch” there
must exist an object with that property—and happily goes
on a witch hunt.
We’ve already given two toy examples of this—the witch
hunt for random numbers in a list of integers (§2), and the
“concrete example” in §5. In the latter, the high entropy of
a shuffled deck miraculously collapses—by just looking at
the deck—to the the minimal entropy of a virgin deck (1 in
our count scale, 0 in the conventional log-count scale). No
amount of torture will extract from that deck a confession
of its current entropy, since there is no such thing in the
deck itself.
Here we shall give, as a more detailed example—a stream-
lined version of that proposed by Paul and Tatiana Ehren-
fest as representative of the fluctuations paradox[6].
Consider a row of 100 checker pieces, or tokens, but white
on one face and black on the other, and a bingo machine
from which at every shot one will obtain one at random of
100 balls numbered 1–100, to be announced and immedi-
ately placed back in the basket. An ur-state of the row is
any specific configuration of face colors (black and white)
for the tokens; there are thus 2100 different ur-states.
Initially, all 100 tokens show white faces. This informa-
tion uniquely characterizes the system’s state, and so this
state’s entropy is 1. Balls are drawn sequentially, and,
every time ball n is drawn, token n is turned over (or
“flipped”). The row will display an increasing number of
black tokens, and soon some black tokens will start to turn
white again. When black and white tokens are close to
an equal number, the frequency of black→white transitions
will approximately match that of white→black ones, and
the white:black ratio will be dynamically maintained at ap-
proximately 50:50, where the entropy is maximal. While,
as we’ve seen, there is only one configurations showing no
black tokens, there are ≈ 1029 configurations with a 50:50
population! Small population fluctuations about the 50:50
ratio are common, and thus corresponding departures of
entropy from that ceiling value of ≈ 1029, or “entropy fluc-
tuations,” are common.
But on what conditions? Suppose that instead of 100 to-
kens in a row we had a square of one-million by one-million
tokens (a trillion in all) displayed on a screen. For com-
parison, an ordinary TV screen has only about 1000×1000
pixels; this number is chosen to be large enough that one
can barely make out the individual pixels. Then in practice,
when viewing our entire 1,000,000×1,000,000 screenful of
tokens, we won’t be able to distinguish configurations that
differ just by the color of a few individual tokens, since from
that distance we’ll have a slightly blurred picture! And the
value—in terms of information conveyed—of a blurred pic-
ture is inversely proportional to the amount of blurring—
that is, the number of different fine-grained pictures that
in effect have been confused with one another by the blur-
ring. This is indeed the entropy—or, with Clausius original
term (cf. §4), the “transformation contents” of the blurring
transformation.
In spite of the blurring, all is not lost. The overall inten-
sity of black on white scattered over a surface is additive.
In half-screen printing—that fine mesh of variable-size dots
barely perceptible in the texture of a newspaper picture—
a number of black dots of a certain size over an otherwise
white area, collectively give the visual impression of a cer-
tain level of grey. And that level is something we can easily
perceive, or measure with a photocell; this will provide an
indirect way to estimate at least the number, if not the
precise position, of black tokens present in a certain area.
As a result, we do receive some information, and the en-
tropy of the picture we see is less than that of knowing that
“it could be just any picture.” In effect we are allowed to
peek—though through blurred glasses.
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Returning to our row of tokens, let’s suppose that the
whole updating process is taking place in a separate room,
out of my sight and hearing. There tokens are flipped ac-
cording to “bingo calls” like “Flip token 7!,” “Flip token
75!,” etc., regularly spaced one second apart. Suppose fur-
ther that after a while I am invited to bet a dollar on the
current token configuration, with odds 1:n—that is, I get n
dollars if I’ve hit on the right configuration. What value of
n should I insist on for the game to be fair?
With this picture in mind, let’s consider the following
three scenarios:
internal entropy (a) I’m given the initial token configura-
tion, (b) I can hear the bingo calls through an intercom,
and (c) I am willing and capable to update my men-
tal model of the process according to the information
given to me.
Then anything above one dollar will be reward enough,
since I’ll be able to track the process in full detail and
on my own. That will make mine a sure bet! No needs
to bother entropy.
Remark that the law of this dynamical system—the entire se-
quence of flips announced to me—is deterministic and invertible.
To see this, suppose that my friend Elsie wants to “predict” the
whole sequence of token configuration backwards, starting from
the last configuration, using only the laws of the dynamics that
had been applied to go forward. To this purpose I give her the
sequence of bingo calls as it had been given to me; this sequence,
together with the provision that each called token is to be flipped,
represent the entire law. Starting with the last configuration as
an initial state, she applies that sequence of instructions, but us-
ing the inverse operations in the reverse order. Now, the inverse
of “flip” happens to be again “flip,” so Elsie will progressively un-
flip each token that had been flipped, finally holding in her hand
the initial configuration as reconstructed from the last and the
law.
honest entropy with an external component In this
scenario, I cannot hear the contents of the bingo calls—
but I can still infer when each is made by looking at
my watch.
In this case, after one step the choice of possible config-
urations jumps from 1 to 100; in fact, I know that one
token has flipped, but I don’t know which. Note that
the law is deterministic for the guy who flips the tokens
in the other room—it is being “dictated” to him by the
bingo caller and thus he has no choice. However it is
nondeterministic for me, as I don’t hear the numbers
called.
On the second step, in one case out of 100 (but I don’t know
which) the caller will draw the same number as on the first step,
in which case that token will get unflipped and we go back to the
original configuration—a single ur-state. In the other 99 out of
100 cases a new token will be hit, so the result will be two black-
faced token—and of distinct configurations like that there are
100×99/2. By taking the geometric mean of the two situations,
weighted respectively 1 and 99, we get an equivalent ur-state
count of (99 · 50)99/100 ≈ 4546. And so forth, step after step
of blind reckoning with more and more complicated expressions
for the expected equivalent count, converging to an asymptotic
value of
(100
50
)
for t→∞, corresponding to an expected number
of 50 black tokens.
Note that even though the actual number of black
tokens may go up and down, the above sequence of
entropy values, relating to my state of knowledge, is
strictly monotonically increasing, with no fluctuations
whatsoever.
partial peeking In this last scenario, I do not want to
do all those tedious computations to determine the ex-
tent of my uncertainty. Fortunately I discover that in
the wall between the two rooms there is a groundglass
window. The blurry view through it does not let me
distinguish the individual tokens, but it lets me esti-
mate the number of black tokens by the level of gray
of the row as a whole seen as a blurry patch. Then,
by monitoring this number in real time (as “parasite”
of the actual game being played in the next room, I
can enjoy some of it without having to perform a sim-
ulation of it myself), I can infer the number of token
configurations corresponding to the current estimated
number of black tokens. Depending on the specific to-
kens affected step by step, this number is quite likely
to display fluctuations about the general trend, in vio-
lation of the strong second law!
The entropy obtained in the third scenario is not, of
course, a form of what we called “honest entropy;” here I
peeked! It is an example of what is commonly called coarse-
grained entropy to distinguish it from microscopic entropy
(which, as already mentioned, roughly corresponds to what
we called internal entropy). Also see the end of §7.1.
8 Shannon’s formula deconstructed
Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, Lady, were no crime
—Andrew Marvell, “To his coy mistress,” ca. 1655
Here we shall start with the standard entropy formula in
Shannon’s form ((3)),
S = −
∑
i
pi ln pi, (17)
which, as we’ve seen, drops the “physical legacy” dimen-
sional coefficient k of (1), and will deconstruct it in a num-
ber of steps in order to subject it to “structural analysis.”
Though nice and compact, the Shannon formula for entropy
is not very transparent to the uninitiated.
1. Why the leading minus sign, since probabilities are pos-
itive?
2. Where does the logarithm come from?
3. How come the quantity pi appears two times in the
formula? Does it play different roles in the two places?
4. What is all this probability stuff?
Finally,
5. What does the whole thing mean?
Among other things, we’ll argue that, after peeling off
the convenient but inessential logarithmic wrapping, this
formula is a generalization of a count, and as such is drop-in
ready, as it were, for replacement of the entropy-as-a-count
used in the arguments of the preceding sections.
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At the end of the day, we’ll conclude that the structure of
that formula was sound—though a bit baroque—and that
most of the pieces that we’d taken out to examine can go
right back in.
As a first thing, the naive may wonder where that minus
sign might have come from, since one is dealing with posi-
tive quantities throughout. Let us acknowledge that this is
a purely graphical convenience. After passing through the
logarithmic filter, division become subtraction and inverse
become opposite (or “the ‘negative’,” in casual talk). When
log(1/p) is written in display style it appears as log
1
p
, and
thus is ugly and wastes vertical space—even more when we
substitute for p a taller expression. Thus the minus sign
does not indicate something conceptual that you may have
missed, but is merely a spacesaving device. If we waive this
“convenience,” (17) becomes
S =
∑
i
pi ln
1
pi
, (18)
with no minus sign! At this point, one is immediately re-
minded that, if p = {p1, . . . , pn} is a probability distribu-
tion and x = {x1, . . . , xn} a random variable over i (a more
modern term is “random function”) then
∑
i pixi is the ex-
pectation (or expected value) of x, denoted Expp[x]. In our
case, (18) can be rewritten as
S = Expp
[
ln
1
p
]
, where ln
1
p
stands for {ln 1
p1
, . . . , ln 1
pn
}.
(19)
The argument of the expectation is, as expected (no pun
intended), a random variable, spelled in a customary short-
hand; the full spelling is the expression in curly braces.
The value of the expectation is the arithmetic average of
(the values of) the random variable in the argument. We’ll
next discuss the meaning of that random variable.
8.1 Equivalent count
We’ve seen in that in (19), while p is a probability distribu-
tion, ln 1p is instead a random variable over the same set of
outcomes (the latter labeled {1, 2, . . . , n}). With the same
shorthand, 1/p is also a random variable; the fact that its
value 1/pi for outcome i happens to equal the inverse of the
value pi of the probability weight of the same outcome, is not
a mathematical tautology (like “1/x is course the inverse of
x—by definition”) but a coincidence—an artifact arising by
construction in making up that particular random variable.
Imagine an urn containing n marbles which may have different colors,
red, green, blue, etc., and count the number of marbles of each color,
nred, ngreen, . . . . Not being interested in the total number n but only
in the fraction of marbles of each color, we rewrite that fraction as
a probability distribution {pred, pgreen, . . . }, where pi = ni/n. The
value n is thereby lost.
At this point we assign to the marbles a posteriori a new property—
let’s call it equivalent count—besides their color. Remark that this
property will not depend on the physical features of a marble per se—
color, radius, mass, or even where it is in the urn—but only on how
many marbles of the same color there are in the urn relative to the
total number. As a property “of a marble” it has a peculiar behavior.
For example, it will change by the simple fact of adding a new marble,
of any color, to the urn, without touching the original one. Even if, as
part of a nationwide lottery game, the “urn” consisted of the joint
contents of two widely separate containers, yet making a minimal
change to the contents of one container will affect the equivalent count
of a marble in the other container, even though no physical interaction
between the two containers has taken place.
In our case, that “spooky action at a distance,” as Einstein might
have called it (cf. [7]), has to do with the self-referential nature of
the construction of the “equivalent count” random function. In effect,
the latter is a “property” of the physical marble only insofar as it is
a property of the entire distribution, which in turn is an expresson
of the joint makeup of the two containers. (We had the same issue
with the prom photo example of §5.) This “entanglement,” as it were,
takes place not in the concrete world, but only within the abstract
construct of a distribution—which by definition changes as a whole
whenever the makeup of the urn is altered.
If the pi’s happen to be all equal, then p ≡ 1/n, where n
is the number of outcomes in the distribution of which the
pi are the weights. Intuitively, if the size of a pizza slice is
one-third of the whole pizza and the pizza has been cut into
equal parts, then the number of slices must be three. We
can think of the equivalent count of a single slice of any size
(independent of the sizes of the other slices) as the number
of slices of that size which could be cut out of the whole
pizza, counting in that number also the fraction of a slice
that might be left as a “remainder. Thus if we have just
two slices, of sizes respectively 1/3 and 2/3, the equivalent
count of the first slice will be 3 and that of the second 1.5
(that is, we can only get one-and-a-half slice of that size
from the whole pizza).
It is clear that p and 1/p, while numerically just the in-
verse of one another, stand for quantities that are of a rather
different nature. To highlight that, it will be helpful to give
the random variable equivalent count, born 1/p, its own
symbol v; that is, vi = 1/pi.
I’ve come to believe that much of the confusion, uneasi-
ness, and controversy surrounding entropy hinges on that
disturbing self-referential nature of “equivalent count.”
The magic allure of self-reference has been extensively and gloriously
illuminated by logician and magician Raymond Sullyvan (my vote for
a “Unesco World Heritage Unique Human Resource”) in his popular
books—for one, Forever Undecided: A puzzle guide to Go¨del [24].
8.2 Why logarithms?
From the viewpont of the above subsection, the entropy S of
the urn is the log of the mean equivalent count of a certain
kind of outcome—in our case, marble color (the mean being
taken over all individual marbles).
What happens if we strip the log from S by taking the
exponential of the whole expression—thus obtaining the
quantity V = eS? Use of the logarithm is very convenient
in practice (and, as we stress below, also has an impor-
tant conceptual role in the physics of information), but is
mathematically irrelevant. It just lowers by 1 the rank of
arithmetical operations: a product turns into a sum, a quo-
tient into a difference, a power into a multiple, and, as we’ve
seen, an inverse into an opposite. What’s important now is
that a geometric mean turns into an arithmetic mean. If we
“undo” the log in S we get back the geometric mean. Thus
V can be rewritten as follows (where we use the variable
v for the equivalent count 1/p as introduced at the end of
§8.1):
V = eS =
∏
i vi
pi = GExp[v], (20)
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where the pre-subscript G reminds one that what we intend
is the geometric mean.
We shall call variety the quantity V introduced above.
Then (20) reads as “The variety of a distribution is the (ge-
ometric) mean of its equivalent count.” If we went whole
hog and used self-variety as a term for the equivalent count
v, then we’d notice the tautological equivalence of the above
sentence with a better known sentence, namely, “The infor-
mation (or entropy) of a distribution is the (arithmetic)
mean of its self-information ln 1p .”
The term “variety” in this general context was introduced
by Ross Ashby in 1956[2]. Even though his use of the term
with the meaning of “simple count” rather than “equivalent
count” is today deprecated (see §8.3), he clearly makes the
point that reporting a count as such or through a log of it
is a practical rather than conceptual issue:
Variety can be stated as an integer, . . . or as the
logarithm to the base 2 of the number, i.e.,in bits.
More recently, and by wide consensus, variety has
been reintroduced—with the present meaning of “mean
equivalent count”—as one of the most useful indices of
diversity[10, 9]. This mostly in biology, taxonomy, pale-
ontology, ecology, economics, cataloging and inventorying,
etc. To quote from Straathof’s abstract[26],
The antilog of Shannon’s entropy is a suitable in-
dex of product variety for three reasons. First, for
symmetric product types it is equal to the num-
ber of product types. Second, disaggregation of
the underlying product set always leads to an in-
crease in measured product variety. Third, the
introduction or disappearance of a marginal type
does not cause a discrete change in the variety in-
dex. These properties hold for a class of weights
that includes, but is not limited to, frequencies.
The preference in those areas for this “antilog of Shan-
non’s entropy” rather than Shannon’s entropy itself—in
other words, for dealing with an equivalent count rather
than the log of this count—seems obvious to me. In those
applications, one has to materially go through those things
that are counted (the items of an inventory, the species of
a certain genus, etc.), and the resulting number is on a hu-
man (or computer) scale, because one is counting tangible
objects—whether “bodies,” pieces of a data structure, or
computational events.
In physics and in information science, on the other hand,
one is often counting states of a system, rather than pieces
of it, and that grows exponentially with the number of
pieces. For a mole of gas, with≈ 1024 molecules, in ordinary
conditions one can have some ≈ 101024 states! Physicists
can touch with hand a specific ur-state—and, even that, as
a norm, for just a fleeting moment: water molecules collide
a trillion times per second! As the Greek philosopher Her-
aclitus (≈ 470 bc) put it, “You cannot step twice into the
same river.” One can deal with the entire collection of ur-
states through a symbolic object—a formula or a numeral.
For example, the above number’s decimal representation,
which is already a logarithmic compression of a tally count
(the scrawled daily marks on the wall of a prisoner’s cell)
is “only” a trillion trillion digits, thus large but not astro-
nomical. But one can never see in one’s laboratory or ex-
plicitly represent in one’s computer all those 10trillion trillion
states, simultaneously or even just sequentially. This num-
ber is hyper -astronomical: for comparison the total number
of elementary particles in the universe is estimated to be a
“puny” 1085.
To paraphrase the quote at the beginning of this section,
the physicist could well tell the catalog librarian,
Had we but world enough, and time,
your spurning of logarithms, Lady, were no crime!
Beside the practicality of Marvel’s entreats to his coy mis-
tress (the poem’s point is that when he’d be finished count-
ing her beauties they’d both be too old to be able to enjoy
them), there is a strong physical reason for using a loga-
rithm when counting states of a distributed system. This
log essentially counts the number of material parts of the
system—which are all physically present at once. It mea-
sures the amount of the physical resource available to gen-
erate states with—the quantity of state-making stuff. On
the other hand, the state set—the collection of all possible
states of an extended systems is clearly only a potentiality—
a mental fiction. As we’ve seen, not even a microgram of
matter will be able to go through all its possible quantum
states during the age of the universe, and at any moment
will be in only one of them.
We’ve seen that, in its standard form, entropy uses a
logarithmic scale just as a convenient wrapper for the more
intuitive variety (our “mean equivalent count”), and that
the leading minus sign in its formula is graphical space-
saving device made available by the presence of the log.
Moreover, in any large multicomponent system—be it a
computer or a microgram of matter—even a tiny part of it
won’t be able to go through even a tiny fraction of its state
set before the least interaction with the rest of the world
makes its current state, its state set, and its very dynamics
obsolete.
That is illustrated by Borel’s memorable example[3], of how a tiny
displacement of a tiny mass on Sirius will totally disrupt, in a few
collisions’ time, the trajectories of gas molecules in a sample on Earth.
We’ve also seen that, when we partition a collection of
marbles by, say, color, and look at the resulting color classes,
a more informative measure of the collection’s variety than
merely counting the classes is indeed their mean equivalent
count. Giving weight to classes is generalization that one
“cannot refuse!”
In the next subsection we briefly deconstruct probability.
8.3 What’s probability?
In Gibbs’s and Shannon’s formulas above, the letter p,
which we used for a generic “share” or “weight,” actually
stands for probability, and a collection {p1, p2, . . . , pn} of
pi’s with p1 + p2 + · · · + pn = 1 and pi ≥ 0 is accordingly
called a probability distribution.
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But what is probability? A serious problem was raised
by Bruno de Finetti—economist, mathematician, and a pi-
oneer of neo-Bayesianism. We shall see that in phrases like
“this face of the die has probability 1/6”—as well as “this
brick has entropy 18” or “7 is a random number”—do not
literally mean that “having probability 1/6,” “entropy 18,”
or “being random” are intrinsic properties of the named
objects. They are at best shorthands (and as such often
useful) for properties of certain viewpoints or decisions of
an external nature. It is in this vein that on the first day
of his probability lectures Prof. de Finetti would shock his
students with the wake-up call
probability does not exist!
And he’d go on:
The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about
the existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether,
Absolute Space and Time, . . . , or Fairies and
Witches, was an essential step along the road to
scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as
something endowed with some kind of objective
existence, is no less a misleading misconception,
an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize
our true probabilistic beliefs.
But if entropy is supposed to be a numerical weight of
a probability distribution, and probability does not exist,
then entropy is indeed in big trouble! A contemporary
apologist[20] tries to make de Finetti’s slogan more palat-
able by explaining,
[What he means is] that probability does not exist
in an objective sense. Rather, probability exists
only subjectively within the minds of individuals.
Good try! (I’m not being sarcastic.) The issue is, were we
just looking for probability in the wrong material object—
say, this six-faced ivory die instead of the gambler’s brain?
No! The problem is not where we were looking, but what
we were looking for.
Probability is not a fact, but a working hypothesis—the
major premise in a syllogism.
Plato having said “If (major premise) all men are
immortal—and (minor premise) Socrates is a man—then
(conclusion)] Socrates is immortal,” on Socrates’ death
his wife Xantippe can tell Plato, “I know for a fact that
Socrates was a man—your minor premise was right. But
Socrates is dead now—your major premise must have been
wrong!”
In other words, Plato didn’t dictate “All men are im-
mortal (full stop) and therefore Socrates (who’s a man) is
immortal (full stop),” but just proffered a noncommittal “If
. . . then.”
Jaynes paid a tribute to physics when he called his life-
time project[16] Probability Theory: The Logic of Science.
He had previously written a paper that carries a more gen-
eral title, “Probability theory as logic”[14]. But, within
this more ecumenic framework, what distinguishes proba-
bility from ordinary logic? I would have added “Probability
theory as logic in parallel.”
The idea is that the “probability of an event” is a special-
ized kind (not just a vague analog) of a syllogism machine—
let’s call it ParSyll—which takes as arguments a probability
distribution P for the major premise and an event x for the
minor premise, and returns as a conclusion a number p(x).
Thus, p(x) = ParSyll(P, x).
The internals of this machine work as follows. The ma-
jor premise P is a lookup table—a list of primitive ob-
jects called outcomes each accompanied by a numerical
weight. The minor premise x—an event—is any collection
of outcomes—typically specified by some criterion related
to the problem at hand. Given the set x, ParSyll breaks
it up into its elements and looks up in P each of these ele-
ments separately and independently, adding up the result-
ing weights as they come. Since the order of the addends is
irrelevant, the lookups (each of which is in essence a “micro-
syllogisms”) can be performed in any order or concurrently,
and thus “in parallel.” The total accumulated weight is
output as a conclusion—the probability of that event.
A nurse is filling out a form for a patient who happens to be an event :
“Eye color?” “Brown!” “Height?” “Five foot nine!” “Probability?”
“How would I know?” “You’re right, I have to look it up in my
database. One moment . . . today your probability is 1/4!” Note the
different direction of information flow for eye color and probability.
Jaynes calls “mind projection fallacy” the “confusion be-
tween reality and a state of knowledge about reality.”[14, 16]
“The belief that probabilities are realities existing in Na-
ture is pure mind projection fallacy,” since a probability
“is something that we assign, in order to represent a state
of knowledge,” while counts and frequencies are “factual
properties of the real world that we measure or estimate.”
[emphasis mine]
This confusion is certainly facilitated when a verbal short-
cut—such as using “my” in different senses (cf. the climax
“my nose, my dog, my son, my wife, my job, my country,
my God)—crystallizes into a mental groove.
The “ambition prize” for mental projection fallacy (the philosophical
term for this is reification, that is, “turning a mental construct into a
thing”) must be given to Anselm of Canterbury’s ontological proof of
God’s existence (1078): (major premise) God is a being than which
nothing greater can be conceived; (minor premise) One can conceive
of a God A existing in one’s mind, even if one denies the existence of
this God A in reality; (reduction ad absurdum) Then one can conceive
of a being B just like God A but having the additional property of
existing in reality; but (in contradiction to the minor premise) that
being B would be even greater than God A, (conclusion) Therefore,
God exists!
a colleague: And, if I may ask, where did get your major premise?
The answer to the above question, or the equivalent “And
where did you get your probability distribution?” can only
be “I made it up, to put into tentative use and see how well
it works. “What do you mean, ‘you made it up’; didn’t you
use the best of your knowledge to fabricate it?” “Not the
best of my knowledge—that might be the case, but is irrel-
evant. I put into it some specially crafted, pointed working
hypotheses, to see where they would lead. Or maybe I put
into it a colleague and competitor’s presented data (about
which I’m suspicious), to see whether they would lead to
unbelievable conclusions.” If my probability distribution
works well, whether to make earnest predictions or to ex-
pose a colleague’s fraud, I may encourage others to use it.”
This is the gist, and the gift, of MaxEnt.
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It is well known that the exercise of logic never adds to
our knowledge: its role is to make a certain aspect of that
knowledge clearer or more explicit, while keeping all the
rest conveniently out of our sight.
If the machinery of probability is just “logic in parallel,”
then using it will never give us more than is contained in the
probability distribution we started with. So the question
arises, “When (in order to use the convenience of that ma-
chinery) we turned our initial description in terms of more-
or-less vague constrains into a probability distribution—
something more handy to circulate and to play with—are
we sure that we didn’t throw out at least some of the baby
with the bathwater?”
To skirt that dilemma, would it be possible, at least in
principle, to skip the probability stage? To directly go from
a description to a recommendation for action (say, to bet on
a certain event), or to directly compute from a description
of the initial state our best description of the final state?
(Note that I leave open the possibility that such descriptions
might not even be expressible as probability distributions.)
8.4 Nondeterministic systems
With a one-to-many (or nondeterministic) law, a trajectory
may fork out into many branches. We have explicitly dealt
with many-to-one laws, as in the Day 2 dialog and in §7,
but not with one-to-many laws. In the two dialogs of Day 3
(§6.6), we ascribed the de facto nondeterminism to external
“perturbations,” not to the internal law.
One-to-many laws of a genuine internal nature are en-
countered, for instance, in automata theory. In physics and
many other fields, on the other hand, one-to-many laws
usually arise from an attempt to incorporate (for theoret-
ical or practical convenience) into the internal laws of a
nominally self-contained system the effects of small pertu-
bations of an external nature, especially when the latter are
statistically predictable—as in Boltzmann’s well-known gas
transport equation.
We could have easily added a third column to table (16)
to account for formally nondeterministic dynamical sys-
tems. However, while its contribution to the top row (in-
ternal entropy budget) would have been “≥ 0,” and thus
different from the “= 0” of the second column (invertible),
the total would have been the same for both columns.
Thus a third column for one-to-many laws wouldn’t have
introduced a very informative distinction: internal nonde-
terminism and external noise are hard to tease apart in
theory as well as in practice.
In physics, this ambiguous aspect of nondeterminism is
always lurking in the background, when it is not stomping
in the foregroud. All this, while exciting in itself, is only
marginally relevant to the present exploration of the “core
meaning” of entropy, and we shall not delve into it here.
When Einstein said “God doesn’t play dice” he didn’t
close his eyes to certain nondeterministic aspects of quan-
tum mechanics. But he wondered whether quantum me-
chanics was a complete description, and whether a more
complete description would have done away, at least in prin-
ciple, with that nondeterministic component. After all, the
randomness of a die’s throw can easily be explained as a
form of deterministic chaos!
The problem with the latter suggestion is that, as long
as our description of the state of the universe is given by
a conventional probability distribution, such an explanation
by itself will not account for the violation of Bell’s inequal-
ity displayed by certain statistical relations of quantum me-
chanics; for that, we need a density operator (§4, von Neu-
mann).
The general consensus is that the fundamental dynamical
laws of quantum mechanics obey, much as those of classical
mechanics, a strictly one-to-one paradigm. As for the inter-
pretation of some of its nondeterministic aspects, it seems
that, even after a century of deliberations, the jury hasn’t
still made up a single mind.
For example, even though an ordinary probability dis-
tribution is viewed as the default way to express one’s
prior knowledge about the state of a system, the violation
of Bell’s inequality by certain quantum-mechanical effects
seems to rule out the use of a mere probability distribution
as a consistent prior for the universe as a whole.
In his irreverent romp[1], Scott Aaaronson’s says
Quantum mechanics is a beautiful generaliza-
tion of the laws of probability, a generalization
based on the 2-norm rather than the 1-norm, and
on complex numbers rather than nonnegative real
numbers.
These issues (prefigured by the replacement of a probability
distribution by a density operator ; see §4, von Neumann
entry) are exciting in themselves, but only marginally rel-
evant to the present exploration of the “core meaning” of
entropy, and we shall not delve into them here.
8.5 The “many-scenarios interpretation”
of probability
A the end of §8.3 we actually raised two questions, namely,
1. Let us go (say, via MaxEnt) from a description—in
terms of facts stated or constraints given—to a prob-
ability distribution. Is such a conversion information
lossless?
2. Doesn’t a description in terms of facts stated or con-
straints given constitute by itself a bona fide major
premise? And doesn’t the passage of time for a dy-
namical system, together with a list of the random
disturbances affecting its internal dynamics as well as
the degradations externally introduced by our abridged
bookkeeping—doesn’t all of this constitute by itself a
minor premise? If so, can’t a plain—though possibly
gigantic—syllogism derive the desired conclusion from
those major and minor premises?
Before tackling the above two questions, let’s dwell first
on a difficulty that affects both. Namely, many descriptions
are too vague to be usable by themselves as a major premise
or as a recipe for a probability distribution. For exam-
ple, if you intend to use the MaxEnt principle, what range
of probability distributions may satisfy a constraint such
23
as “Tomorrow is going to be much warmer?” Approaches
like Zadeh’s fuzzy logic[35], that quantize warmness as, say,
lukewarm, warmish, warm, very warm, and hot, haven’t
made inroads in spite of their superficial appeal—and not
much else seems to be on the horizon.
I will dispose summarily of Question 1, unfortunately be-
cause at the moment I’m not quite sure of the answer. What
first comes to my mind is, “Can one go back from a prob-
ability distribution to the set of constraints that generated
it via MaxEnt? (Or at least to an acceptable equivalence
class of constraints?)” If one could do that in a systematic
way, then the two formulations would be equivalent, and
the transformation from one and the other (and vice versa)
would be invertible and thus information-lossless.
In this repect, let me quote Jaynes[15] (the emphasis is
mine):
Fuzzy Sets are (quite obviously, to anyone trained
in Bayesian inference) crude approximations to
Bayesian prior probabilities. They were created
only because their practitioners persisted in think-
ing of probability in terms of a “randomness” sup-
posed to exist in Nature but never well defined;
and so concluded that probability theory is not
applicable to such problems. As soon as one rec-
ognizes probability as the general way to specify
incomplete information, the reason for introduc-
ing Fuzzy Sets disappears.
The ambiguity here is in that “specify incomplete infor-
mation” clause. Does it mean, as Jaynes seems to indicate,
“completely capture” the incomplete information, or simply
“do the best we can with the given information, even though
we have no way to use all of it?” In the “much warmer”
example given above, it seems to me that all that one can
consistently use is the constraint “greater than,” while the
“much” qualifier, without further qualification or some us-
age statistics, must unfortunately be discarded. And that
even though we feel that “much warmer” somehow conveys
more information than just “warmer.”
Coming to Question 2, just as we started—a` la
Boltzmann—with entropy as a count, now let us start—a` la
Laplace—with probability as a ratio of counts, i.e.,favorable
over total. Here there is no need to externally assign dif-
ferent weights to different outcomes via a probability dis-
tribution, since the weight of an outcome is a naturally de-
fined internal quantity—simply the number of representa-
tive points—the “favorable count”—of that outcome. The
outcomes thus make up a multiset, and the events are all
the possible subsets of outcomes.
A multiset is like an ordinary set, except that any element may appear
in it in multiple instances (rather than a single one). Let X be the
collection of all these “sets of clones” or outcomes. If N =
∑
x∈X nx is
the total number of elements in the multiset (counting each outcome
x with its multiplicity nx), then the collection {nx/N |x ∈ X} is
evidently a probability distribution.
In the simplest case, with just two outcomes, 0 (for
“heads”) and 1 (for “tails”), the four possible events {}, {0},
{1}, and {0, 1}—representing respectively “neither heads
nor tails,” “heads,” “tails,” and “heads or tails”—have
counts of 0, 1, 1, and 2, which, divided by the number 2
of outcomes, yield “probabilities” 0, 12 ,
1
2 , and 1. However,
this model of an abstract ideal coin becomes instantly use-
less as soon as we want to use it for a real coin—no matter
how ever-so-slight its bias may be. As they say, this model
does not “degrade gracefully.”
Let us take a more flexible approach. Consider the collec-
tion P of all Python programs consisting of no more than
two hundred characters and such that, at a press of a but-
ton, each of these program will output (say, within a thou-
sand machine cycles) a single binary digit. Let the pro-
grams in this well-defined collection be sequentially num-
bered 1, 2, . . . , N , where of courseN is a hyper-astronomical
number. Let us run all these programs in parallel, and
collect into one set the N binary digits generated by one
button press, each digit tagged by the number n of the pro-
gram it came from. Approximately half of those digits will
be 0’s and the other half 1’s. Now just ignore the tags,
and you’ll have a multiset with just two outcomes, 0 and 1,
one being present in n0 (≈ N/2) copies and the other in n1
(= (N − n0)/2) copies. We offer this deterministic piece of
machinery as a model of a (non-deterministic) coin-tossing
machine. To model coins with different biases, just tin-
ker with this collection P of program by throwing out of
it a number of its elements. Unless you know well what
you are doing, you’ll have a hard time getting out of the
decimated collection an expected value other than one close
to some special value such as 0, 1/2, or 1 —just as with
an ordinary coin (have you tried to machine a coin that
will reliably give heads 3.14% of the time?). Of course, by
running this astronomical number of programs one-by-one
and selectively discarding a fraction of them according to
whether their output is 0 or 1, you can “easily” make this
coin tosser come up with any probability in between—or
behave deterministically for you while still remaining ran-
dom for the noninitiated. Physical situations of this kind
are wonderfully discussed in Jaynes’s book[16].
Going back to the statement of Question 2, that gigantic
syllogism’s conclusion may well turn out to be a gigantic
table with 0 and 1 values attached without apparent rhyme
or reason to the zillion individual outcomes or ur-states that
make up the event of concern—no probability distribution
was involved! Then it is up to us to take the responsibility—
as a single optional final step—to summarize that table by
counting the 1’s for each event and using those numbers as
the weights of the respective events.
That is no worse, and possibly better, than going through
the probability-distribution bottleneck, since in that way we
keep all of the information we have till the end (that is why
this approach is so cumbersome) and then only at the last
step throw away what we sensibly can. In the traditional
approach, we jettison most of what seems irrelevant (or just
too unwieldly) before take-off; that makes for a lighter flight,
but will it take us to the same destination?
If you are worried that this “many-worlds” approach may
still not yield enough randomness for the coin, I can throw
in more layers of “super-worlds” (this is a mental experi-
ment, after all) each having different rules for generating its
own lower-level many worlds, and so forth ad infinitum. I
suspect that the limit of this process, which still uses purely
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deterministic resources at every level is the only definition
of randomness that a Laplace would have been happy with.
9 The dynamics of entropy
When we say “the entropy of a black hole” or “entropy of
the market” we must mean something like “the entropy of (a
probability distribution of (quantum states of (. . . of (. . . of
(. . . of (a certain kind of (black hole)). . . ))))). All of the
“of’s” in this hierarchy are like different levels of civil ser-
vants with technical roles that are useful but not necessar-
ily very transparent. Moreover entropy, as a function that
maps a descritpion to a count, has no initiative—it “just
obeys orders!” A policy-maker must do a bit of homework
up and down the hierarchy to figure out the precise effect
of an order given from the top of the hierarchical chain.
Chains of command of this kind beginning with “entropy” are em-
ployed in all sorts of disciplines. Some are short and widely used,
and have developed standards of usage and an agreed upon lingo. So,
when we say “The entropy of a Valentine message is less than a bit per
typed character” (think of the endless repetition of ‘love’ and ‘dove’
and ‘blue’ and ‘you’), everyone in the data transmission business will
understand that this entropy is not about a single character, word, or
message, but, skipping several levels of the hierarchy, is about the lan-
guage—the vocabulary, the style, the mannerism—used by Valentine
chatter as a whole.
Chains headed by “entropy” are less transparent in other
situations. In addition, there may be many chains of the
form “entropy of . . . 〈 something〉” where the last link,
〈something〉, is the same for both, but the internal makeup
of the chain is different. So asking “Mack, what’s the en-
tropy of that brick?” may get you surprisingly different
responses even though they all have “Mack” and “brick” as
first and last link.
The problem all started with Clausius, who, as we’ve seen
in §4, was careful to coin for the quantity he had discov-
ered a new-greek neologism that could hardly be used for
anything else. When he spoke of the “entropy of a transfor-
mation” he had in mind not a function but some sort of fluid
that had coursed in or out of a certain object subjected to
a certain treatment or “transformation”—or even had been
generated within it in the course of the treatment. In that
context, there was only one thing that could be meant by
“a certain amount of entropy.”
Luckily for Clausius’s fame, entropy was eventually found
to be not a physical substance but an abstract concept
of enormous generality—a counting concept (cf. the Boltz-
mann entry in §4 and the Shepherd’s Parable in §7.4). Con-
sequently, today the kinds of things that have a meaningful
entropy associated with them are legion, and a single thing
may have associated with it several entropies—which quan-
tify different aspects of it or different levels of description.
Certain of these new uses of entropy operate at a more ab-
stract level than Clausius’s original construct. But they still
play essentially the very function which Clausius originally
envisaged for his entropy, which is as fundamentally impor-
tant today as it was then. Namely, to determine whether
there are states of a dynamical system that are so easy
to reach from a given state that the transition from the
latter to one of them can occur just about spontaneously,
and whether there are states that are instead virtually un-
reachable. Similarly, to determine under what conditions a
chemical reaction will run in one direction rather than the
other, and what can be done to make this reaction faster
and more efficient, or, on the contrary, to inhibit it. All that
is of ultimate importance in chemistry, biology, materials
science, energy conversion, and so forth. Expectedly—but
regrettably—it is in this area that much confusion arises.
While the objective in those areas is to determine, at least
in a qualitative way, the dynamics of a system by discov-
ering which state transitions are more likely, the strategy
to calculate this has some affinity with a static variational
method. That is, (a) imagine a number of possible states
and the transitions between any two of these states, (b)
compute the entropy difference attached to each of these
transitions, and then (c) consider most likely those transi-
tion that are accompanied by the largest entropy increases.
All of this may sound like wordplay unless one understands
the underlying linguistic ambiguity. When people speak of
a certain system state here, they actually mean a broad de-
scription, and a system is (tautologically) more likely to
be in an ur-state matching a certain description if this de-
scription is broader, that is, encompasses a larger number
of ur-states.
Naively, one may imagine that a transition from one de-
scription to another reflects in some way an actual transi-
tion of the system from an ur-state to another according to
the system’s internal dynamics—but this need not be the
case! We have hinted at this at the end of §5. Here, we
shall illustrate this in more detail by a parable:
A precious gold coin has been stolen from me; through an anonymous
phone call I learn that the coin may have been hidden in one of numer-
ous sacs of base-metal coins stored in a customs warehouse. I go there
and ask to go through the contents of the sacs to retrieve my gold
coin. Given the vagueness of the hint and the scale of the requested
operation, to the customs officer this seems a frivolous request, but
he eventually allows me to go through one single sac of my choice.
I should mark that sac now, but come back in the morning for the
actual search, since he wants to have with him a witness to the op-
eration. The sacs come in all different sizes. Not having any idea of
which sac my coin might be in, I of course choose the largest.
To better hide the coin, unbeknownst to me and the officer, the
thief, who has reasons to fear curious eyes, had been randomly moving
it every night from one sac to another. I come in in the morning; officer
and witness are already there. Before I open the marked sac—call it
sac A—a warehouse employee remarks that a pile of several more sacs
of coins had been found in a corner. One of them—call it sac B—is
much larger than sac A; I ask—and am allowed—to switch my choice
to sac B. I riffle through the sac. Unsurprisingly, given the number
of sacs, the coin is not there after all.
Now, I shall call “ur-state” of a coin (“microscopic” state) the ex-
act physical spot where the coin finds itself, and “state” of the coin
(“macroscopic” state) the sac in which the coin is contained (as far
as I’m concerned, that level of detail is all that that matters). Based
on the information I had at the moment, the most likely state for the
coin to be in, the evening before, was sac A; by midmorning, it had
moved to B; and by the end of the morning, it had moved back to A
or to some other sac in the newly dicovered pile (why?). As for the
coin’s ur-state, it had been shifted during the night from a position
inside some sac C to a position inside a sac other than B (how do we
know?). That’s it!
There was indeed a correlation (an implication, in our case) between
the coin’s internal dynamics—that of its ur-state—and that of its
state: the coin’s microlocation implies what sac it is in, while the
converse is not true—being in a certain sac says nothing about where
25
in the sac. On the other hand, in our scenario the correlation between
the internal dynamics and that of my “best-choice” sac (based merely
on sac size) is very shallow: when this choice moved from sac X to sac
Y , that didn’t mean that the coin itself had moved from a position
inside X to one inside Y . In our contrived scenario, my best-choice
sac changed quite independently of the movements of the coin itself!
In the combinatorics of large systems, there is often a
much better correlation than this between microscopic and
macroscopic dynamics. (More honestly said, we don’t even
take into consideration a proposed macroscopic dynamics
unless it is strongly implied by the microscopics—When it’s
dark, we look for the key only near a lampost; where else?)
Thus, in 100 coin tosses, the expected number of heads
is 50, and even though it is in priciple possible to get as a
result the ur-state “0 heads,” a state with 50 ± 8 heads is
indeed overwhelmingly more likely. In the above gold coin
example, if one sac was way larger than the aggregate of
all the others, for that very “reason”(?) the coin would
be virtually certain to contain it. You will agree that this
“reason”—the argumentation used by entropy—is of a very
different kind than “the coin is likely to be there because I
put it there.”
You might conclude from all this that thermodynamics is
but a collection of trivial tautologies—and you’d of course
be right. But precisely that is what makes the laws of ther-
modynamics so universal and so useful.
10 Conclusions
Returning to the definition of honest entropy in §7.1 and
its illustration by an executive/consultant/auditor contract,
we’ve seen that the entropy “of a system” is that of this con-
tinually adjusted probability distribution representing the
state of a model. Every act of approximation, truncation,
compression, erasure, etc. that entails loss or discarding of
information gives a positive contribution to the system’s
honest entropy. Negative contributions could only come
from peeking (which we have ruled out by contract; see
§7.5), or from losses of internal entropy, which, as we’ve
seen, can only arise from the possible noninvertibility of
the internal dynamics.
In a nutshell, if the consultant’s deliverable is thought of
as the expected value of a system variable, then this deliver-
able will be deemed useless if not accompanied by a standard
deviation honestly calculated according to an accepted dis-
cipline of propagation of uncertainty. With an appropriate
scaling, the latter is what we call honest entropy.
A consultant need to be kept honest in spite of the ob-
vious lure of claiming for his forecasts a smaller entropy
burden than they actually bear. To this purpose the exec-
utive may occasionally use a more expensive auditor (peer
review?) to go through the consultant’s books and ver-
ify that the latter’s entropy was appropriately adjusted up-
wards every time he took a shortcut.
If entropy is a way to quantify the “known unknowns” of
a system’s state, usually representing the diffusive spread,
the blurring, the unavoidable random error attendant to
the use of a low-resolution model, what can one say about
estimating “unknown unknowns,” that is, the unintentional
systematic errors that a model may introduce? Entropy is
silent on this. One may reasonably demand honest accoun-
tants, but for the latter estimate one would need imagi-
native, out-of-the-box, “creative”—as it were—accountants;
and that is an oxymoronic job description that brings in
drawbacks of its own! So we’ll leave that job to the
most competent specialists of each discipline—peer review,
again?
In Shakespeare’s memorable words,10
Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty
deep.
Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man; but
will they come when you do call for them?
Glendower: Why, I can teach you, cousin, to
command the devil.
Hotspur: And I can teach thee, cousin, to shame
the devil by telling the truth. Tell truth and shame
the devil.
With the concept of honest entropy I tried to capture
a physicist’s—but not only a physicist’s—idealization of
something like a “best accounting practice” when making
predictions. If you can, measure; if you can’t measure, peek.
If you can’t either, all you can do is imagine and compute—
but, if you care about your reputation, attach to your pre-
dictions their “honest entropy” margin of error.
If I had to explain entropy standing on one leg instead of
writing a thirty-page article, I would ask, “Why is parking
into a tight spot harder than coming out of it? Note that
the process is mechanically invertible—for every path going
in there is a well-defined time-reverse path coming out.”
answer: (I’m dead serious) Because of the second law of
thermodynamics—There are many more ways (greater entropy) for
my car to be in the middle of the street than in a tight parking spot!
If then I had to explain honest entropy standing on one
big toe, I would answer, with Joseph Stalin, “It’s not the
votes that count, but who counts the votes!”
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